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THE "UNPRECEDENTED INTRUSION":*
A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED
GRANDPARENT VISITATION CASES
JOAN C. BOHL**
Grandparent visitation statutes are creatures of the late twentieth century, born,
with varying degrees of legitimacy, from the confluence of the political, social, and
medical changes of our time. At common law, parental decisions concerning a child's
contact with a grandparent or, indeed, with anyone outside of the nuclear unit, were
constrained, if at all, by moral rather than legal forces.' Grandparent visitation
statutes were unknown at common law as were most grandparents themselves, given
typical life expectancies.2 Beginning with medical advancements in the latter half of
this century, however, the lifespans, and indeed the quality of life itself, began
changing dramatically for average Americans. The man who might have lived to
forty-seven at the turn of the century' could now expect to live a vigorous life into
his seventies." The woman who had a one-in-fifty chance of dying in childbirth in
1970 saw the chance reduced to one in 125 by 1991.' A growing divorce rate6 and
changes in societal attitudes towards illegitimacy7 served to make single parenthood
* Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993).
** Instructor of Legal Writing, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1977, Boston
University; J.D., 1983, Suffolk University Law School. Portions of this article were presented at the
International Society of Family Law North American Regional Conference on Parent and Child in North
American Family Law, held in Quebec, Canada, on June 14, 1996.
1. In re Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894), contains one of the earliest judicial statements, of this
proposition and is generally representative of the position taken in common law jurisdictions in the
absence of some legislative grant of grandparent visitation. See Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522,
524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975, writ refd n.r.e.); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 92 (1987); J.F.
Rydstrom, Annotation, Visitation Rights of Persons Other Than Natural or Adoptive Parents, 98
A.L.R.2d 325, 326 (1964).
2. LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 71-72 (1977).
3. REBECcA J. DONATELLE & LORRAINE G. DAVIS, AccEss TO HEALTH 475 (3d ed. 1994).
4. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
87-88 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
5. In 1970, 21.5 women per thousand died in childbirth in the United States; by 1991 this rate had
dropped to 7.9 women per thousand. 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 91.
6. Between 1950 and 1992 the number of divorces obtained per year in this country more than
tripled, from 385,000 to 1,215,000. 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at 75. This trend has
been the subject of frequent comment in connection with issues of grandparent visitation. See, e.g.,
Grandparents Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services
of the House of Representatives Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong. 9 (1991) [hereinafter 1991
Congressional Hearings] (statement of John H. Pickering, Chair, Commission on Legal Problems of the
Elderly, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.).
7. In 1970, 11% of all children born in the United States were born to unmarried women; by 1991
that percentage had almost tripled, increasing to 30%. 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, at
958. This acceptance of illegitimacy was permanently enshrined in American popular culture by a series
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acceptable and correspondingly more common, further changing the face of American
society. Most of the foregoing may be common knowledge. A less conspicuous
byproduct of these changes, however, was the fact that when hard times befell the
inevitably more vulnerable single parent family, grandparents were a more common
source of child-rearing help.'
Early grandparent visitation statutes thus responded, legitimately, to the plight of
grandparents who assumed parental roles during the precarious times of their
children's divorces, illnesses, or deaths, only to be shut out when stability returned
to their children's lives In this form, grandparent visitation statutes simply protected
of episodes in the television situation comedy "Murphy Brown," originally airing in 1992, in which
Murphy becomes pregnant, decides she will not marry the father of her child, and decides, instead, to
raise the baby on her cwn. Condemning the story line and the social phenomenon it reflects, Vice
President Dan Quayle characterized both as factors in the breakdown of family values and social order,
Quayle Gives Birth to Furor over TV Mom, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., May 21, 1992, at Al, and
immediately found himrelf at the vortex of a firestorm of criticism. For feminist leaders, Quayle's
remarks demonstrated his "blindness and insensitivity to social reality: that a growing number of women
are choosing to have children outside of marriage." James Rowley, More and More Unwed Women
Bearing Children, AP, July 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File. Ethel Long-Scott,
executive director of the Women's Economic Agenda Project, called Quayle's remarks "an assault on
women." Alice Kahn & Sam Whiting, Dan Quayle Is No Ladies' Man, S.F. CHRON., May 21, 1992, at
D3. Said one single mother, "Murphy Brown createls] a feeling of belonging to the new American
family." Rowley, supra. The contours of this new American family were evident in census findings
released in June 1992. Among women 18-44 who had never married, 24% were mothers in 1992, as
opposed to 15% in 1982. AMARA BACHU, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 1992, at xv (1993). This trend appeared "in all levels
of society," according to Carl Haub, a demographer at the Washington research organization Population
Reference Bureau. Rowley, supra. A 1995 survey conducted by U.S. News and World Report found that
70% of those questioned stated that "when children are born to single mothers, it is 'preferable for them
to be raised by their mothers' than in a two parent adoptive family." Joseph P. Shapiro et a., Honor Thy
Children, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 27, 1995, at 42.
8. 1991 Congressional Hearings, supra note 6, at 1-2 (opening statement of Chairman Thomas J.
Downey). Aggressive lobbying and support groups representing grandparents who have assumed parental
roles have proliferated nationally, with ever increasing visibility. Grandparents Raising Grandchildren
Resolution Adopted by 1995 White House Conference on Aging, 1 PARENTING GRANDCHILDREN, Summer
1995, at 1-2 (Brookdale Newsletter from the AARP Grandparent Information Center, Washington, D.C.).
In May 1995, delegates to the White House Conference on Aging passed resolution 20.3, "Addressing
Issues Related to Grandparents Raising Grandchildren," which called for comprehensive increases in the
financial, social, and legal support available to grandparent caregivers. Id. at 3.
9. In a typical scenaio, a mother dies in childbirth and the grieving father entrusts the infant to one
set of grandparents or tha other. After a period of months or years the child's father wants to reclaim his
child and resume the role of custodial parent. Although the grandparents, now attached to the child resist,
the rights of a fit parent typically prevailed. See Sloan v. Jones, 62 S.E. 21 (Ga. 1908); Miller v.
Wallace, 76 Ga. 479 (1886). Grandparents were occasionally awarded some sort of visitation after
custody was returned to the father. See Wofford v. Clark, 102 S.W. 216,218-19 (Ark. 1907). Generally,
however, that possibility was not even entertained. Sloan, 62 S.E. at 30 ("As fond grandmothers
sometimes do, she even feels that she has legal rights to the child superior to his father. But however
tender may be her love for her grandchild, God gave the child to his parents, not his grandparents. In
law the father is entitled to the custody .... "). Recent courts and commentators have noted the
continued significance c f a custodial relationship between grandparent and grandchild in grandparent




the quasi-familial status the grandparent had acquired by temporarily assuming a
parental role. But if politics makes strange bedfellows, it makes even stranger laws.
Gradually, under the impressive political clout wielded by a graying America,l'
grandparent visitation laws evolved from a constitutionally proper protection of a
quasi-parental role, which had been occupied, fortuitously, by a grandparent, to the
constitutionally questionable protection of people who were grandparents simply
because they were grandparents." In this new incarnation, grandparent visitation
statutes did not concern themselves with whether the grandchildren's family life had
suffered disruption.12 Instead, they allowed grandparents to use "the awesome power
of the state"" to challenge the child-rearing decisions of a child's own fit married
parents. The open-ended grandparent visitation statute had been born.
Challenges brought in different jurisdictions to the constitutionality of open-ended
grandparent visitation statutes have been answered with wildly inconsistent judicial
pronouncements; two examples can best illustrate the polarization of thought. In
August 1988 a dispute arose between one W.R. King and his son and daughter-in-
1995); 1991 Congressional Hearings, supra note 6, at 22. Indeed, in Spradling v. Harris, 778 P.2d 365,
369 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989), the court affirmed an award of grandparent visitation, noting that the children
had lived with the grandmother and citing with approval an earlier case which found the fact that the
grandchild had lived with the grandmother so significant that it awarded visitation in spite of testimony
from a psychologist that the visitation "would be detrimental to the child's health." Id. at 369 (citing
Commonwealth ex reL Goodman v. Dratch, 159 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960)).
10. In 1992, 70.1% of all people 65 years of age and older voted. In contrast, the percentages of
people voting were consistently and significantiy lower in the age groups most likely to include parents,
as opposed to grandparents. In 1992, 53.2% of those aged 25-34 voted, and 63.6% of those 35-44 voted.
Furthermore, as the over-65 age group grew in absolute numbers over the 14 years between 1978 and
1992, so too did the percentage who voted. Thus, 65.1% of the 23 million Americans 65 years of age
and older in 1984 voted, whereas 70.1% of the 30.8 million Americans 65 years of age and older voted
in 1992. 1994 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 4, at 287; see also 1991 Congressional Hearings,
supra note 6, at 1-2 (opening statement of Chairman Thomas J. Downey) (noting that approximately
three-fourths of older Americans are grandparents and that "[lt is a well-known fact that seniors are the
most active lobby in this country"); id. at 4 (statement of Olympia J. Snowe) (noting the increased
political activity of seniors).
11. This pattern underlies virtually all open-ended grandparent visitation statutes. See, e.g., Beagle
v. Beagle, 654 So. 2d 1260, 1260-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (tracing the evolution of Florida's open-
ended grandparent visitation statute); Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777, 781-82 (Nev. 1995) (tracing
unsuccessful legislative attempts to expand Nevada's grandparent visitation statute into an open-ended
grandparent visitation statute); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 576 n.1 (Tenn. 1993) (tracing the
evolution of the open-ended grandparent visitation statute that it subsequently concluded violated the
Tennessee constitution).
12. The first state to enact an open-ended grandparent visitation statute was N.Y. in 1966. See N.Y.
DOM. REL LAW § 72 (McKinney 1988). Currently statutes in 17 states are "open-ended." See CAL FAM.
CODE § 3100(a) (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-59 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West
1986); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983) (repealed 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1994); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie Supp. 1989); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1995); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1994); Mo. Ev. STAT. § 452.402 (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1995);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1996); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (Supp. 1995);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-52 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013 (Supp. 1995).
13. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
19961
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law, Stewart and Ann King, the married, natural parents of a child named Jessica,
who was then almost a year-and-a-half old. 4 The elder Mr. King alleged that the
younger Mr. King did not work hard enough on the family farm and evicted the King
family from the house they occupied on the elder Mr. King's land."5 The King
family moved, Jessica's parents being of the opinion that the elder Mr. King was
overbearing and intruded excessively in their family life. 6 This incident might have
remained simply one more indication that human relations rarely correspond to any
ideal, sentimentalized 7 or otherwise, but for Kentucky's grandparent visitation
statute. Without statutory limitation or qualification of any kind, section 405.021 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes conferred standing on the elder Mr. King to sue the
King family for court-ordered access to Jessica." This he did and was awarded
biweekly visitation. The King family unsuccessfully appealed; the constitutionality
of the grandparent visitation statute was confirmed by five of the seven justices of
the Kentucky Supreme Court. 9
While the King family's appeal wound its way through the Kentucky appellate
process, a similar scenario was unfolding across the state line in Tennessee between
grandparents Bill and Sue Hawk and their son and daughter-in-law, the married,
natural parents of Megan and Steven. Bill Hawk accused his son of being unable
to stand up to his wife "as a man."'" The younger Hawks disapproved of Bill
Hawk's means of disciplining Megan and Steven. ' In May 1989, Bill Hawk fired
his son from his job at the bowling alley owned by the elder Hawks. The elder
Hawks then filed suit pursuant to Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute, seeking
court-ordered access to Megan and Steven. Like Kentucky's grandparent visitation
statute, a Tennessee statute conferred on grandparents an essentially unlimited right
to sue; 4 like the elder Mr. King in Kentucky, the elder Hawks were awarded regular
visitation. The younger Hawks appealed. In contrast to the Kentucky Supreme Court
majority's uncritical approval of Kentucky's open-ended grandparent visitation statute,
the Tennessee Supreme Court found functionally identical statutory language to be
14. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky. 1992).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. In his comprehensive and strongly worded dissent to the King majority opinion, Justice Lambert
characterizes the majority's analysis as based entirely on a "sentimental notion" of the relationship
between a grandparent and grandchild. Id. at 633 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 63 1. The statute provides, in pertinent part: "Reasonable Visitation Rights to Grandparents.
(1) The circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal grandparents
of a child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree if it determines that it is the best interest
of the child to do so." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie 1989).
19. Justice Lambert dissented with a separate opinion in which Justice Wintersheimer joined: Justice
Wintersheimer dissented with a separate opinion in which Justice Lambert joined. Id. at 633-38.
20. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
21. hia at 575.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 576.
24. "[TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991)] ... allows a court to order 'reasonable visitation' with




unconstitutional as applied to "admittedly good parents,"'  describing it as "a
virtually unprecedented intrusion into a protected sphere of family life."'
These two irreconcilable assessments of the validity of open-ended grandparent
visitation statutes, far from being merely two academically interesting anomalies,
actually represent the two prototypical judicial responses. With remarkably little
variation, all open-ended grandparent visitation suits27 follow either one analytical
pattern or the other.' Although it has certainly been criticized as an exercise in
unthinking sentimentality, the majority view of the Kentucky Supreme Court
proceeds from the essentially laudable impulse to use the strong arm of the law to
"improve" its citizens and thereby provide children with better lives.3 The fact that
an award of grandparent visitation under those circumstances amounts to the
imposition of a state sanctioned ideal is easily obscured in the court's appealing
characterization of grandparents as a group." The Tennessee Supreme Court's view,
in contrast, finds the best interests of the child under the circumstances to be best
25. I. at 577.
26. Id.
27. Although the origins of the family integrity right make constitutional arguments especially
compelling when the child lives in an intact family, see infra notes 46, 47-69 and accompanying text,
family privacy interests do not disappear following death or divorce. These two opposing analyses of
grandparent visitation statutes also surface in cases where the statute in question allow a suit for visitation
only after a disruptive event has occurred within the family. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d
635, 641 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (finding familial privacy rights inapplicable in challenge to
constitutionality of a grandparent visitation statute); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 461 S.E.2d 745, 749-50 (N.C.
1995) (rejecting grandparents' attempt to seek visitation under a statutory amendment which equated
"custody" and "visitation" both in light of applicable principles of statutory construction and in light of
parents' right to determine with whom their children will associate).
28. Very little data exists concerning the number of grandparent visitation suits actually filed. Many
cases may settle before any formal judicial proceeding; those that do not may be resolved at the trial
level, in unreported decisions, with the losing party lacking either the resources or the resolve to appeal.
Reports generated by the State of California suggest that approximately 5% of its custody/visitation
disputes are grandparent visitation disputes, although the figure is probably low. 1991 Congressional
Hearings, supra note 6, at 43 (statement of Judith M. Filner, Senior Associate, National Institute for
Dispute Resolution). The unscientific observations of one California family law practitioner suggested
that 20% of his practice consisted of grandparent visitation cases, and confirmed that most cases settle
prior to trial. Telephone Interview with Robert S. Walmsley, Partner, Walrnsley and Walmsley, Orange
County, Cal. (Mar. 20, 1996).
29. King, 828 S.W.2d at 633 (Lambert, J.. dissenting).
30. One of the best commentaries on the concept of using law in this fashion is still that of on
retired Vermont Supreme Court Justice Isaac F. Redfield, commenting on the Illinois Supreme Court case
of People v. Turner in 1871:
The love of reform comes always from the best of purposes; from a desire to have others
participate in the beauty and excellence which we have found ourselves. But we cannot
disguise the fact, as we look back across the dark tract of the ages, that reformers in all
times and in all countries, invoke the aid of force and compulsion, in some form. They
sincerely believe themselves entitled to exercise the strong arm of the law.
Isaac F. Redfield, Annotation to People v. Turner, 19 AM. L. REG. (O.S.) 372, 374 (1871).
31. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 632. This sentimentalization of grandparents as a group actually
results in clearly discernible distortions and errors in the analytical processes of courts which uphold the
constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes. See infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
1996]
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served by remaniag in the undisturbed custody of fit parents." By thus resting its
decision on the presumption that parents and their children occupy a private sphere
the state may not enter, the court adds a constitutionally based conception of privacy
to its grandparent visitation analysis. Ultimately, therefore, the significance of an
open-ended grandparent visitation statute extends beyond the specific effect it may
have on the individual grandparents, parents, and children involved, for it requires us
to consider, if only obliquely, the contours of family privacy, the nature of state
control over its citizens, and the sources of the state power to exert that control.
The conclusions a given court will reach regarding a grandparent visitation suit
applied to an intact family are predetermined by the court's understanding of three
related key concepts: the family integrity right,33 the appropriate standard of
constitutional review for a grandparent visitation statute,' and the sources of state
power. 5 With regard to the family integrity right, for example, courts which
validate open-ended grandparent visitation statutes find that family privacy is limited
and limitable. They do not conceptualize family life as fundamentally distinct from
state control, "the private realm ... which the state may not enter."3 The King
court states, for example, that "while the [federal] Constitution... does recognize
the right to rear children without undue governmental interference that right is not
inviolate."37
In contrast, courts which invalidate grandparent visitation awards on constitutional
grounds share an expansive understanding of the family integrity right. The Hawk
court notes, for example, that United States Supreme Court cases affirming specific
aspects of child-rearing autonomy actually "reflect[] the Court's larger concern with
privacy rights for the family. 3 The Hawk court notes, further, that familial privacy
is in fact the cornerstone of a constitutional right to privacy: "The Court's protection
of parental rights thus evidences a deeper concern for the privacy rights inherent in
the federal Constitution."39 This article takes the position that courts which uphold
the validity of open-ended grandparent visitation statutes share a common misap-
prehension of the family in constitutional jurisprudence and of the family integrity
right and have produced analyses of grandparent visitation which are correspondingly
flawed.
A second characteristic of grandparent visitation decisions which distinguishes
opinions invalidating open-ended grandparent visitation statutes from those that do
not is the constitutional standard of review applied. Courts which invalidate
grandparent visitation awards on constitutional grounds apply a standard of strict
32. "We find ... that without a substantial danger of hann to the child, a court may not
constitutionally impose its own subjective notions of the 'best interests of the child' when an intact,
nuclear family with fit, married parents is involved." Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 579.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 134-70.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 191-296.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 298-393.
36. Prince v. Mas;achusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
37. King, 828 S.W.2d at 631.
38. Hawk 855 S.W.2d at 578.




scrutiny, either expressly or implicitly. The Hawk court states, for example, that in
the circumstances under review, "[tihe state lacks a sufficiently compelling
justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their
children as they see fit."'
Perhaps, not surprisingly, courts holding that awards of grandparent visitation may
properly be made against the wishes of intact families employ a standard of review
far less demanding than strict scrutiny. Some courts in this category simply assert
that the intrusion occasioned by a grandparent visitation suit is not a constitutionally
cognizable infringement of the family integrity right. Other courts in this category
reach the same diminished level of scrutiny by applying the undue burden test4' and
concluding that rational basis review is appropriate because an award of grandparent
visitation does not "unduly burden" the constitutional right to familial autonomy.
Under either strand of analysis, review is deemed appropriately made under a rational
basis standard, a standard so deferential that a grandparent visitation statute will be
upheld if the reviewing court can hypothesize any justification for it at all. This
article takes the position that since grandparent visitation legislation inevitably
impacts a single fundamental right, the right to family integrity, neither deferential
rational basis review nor the balancing process embodied in an undue burden test are
appropriate. Under appropriately strict judicial scrutiny, grandparent visitation statutes
fail to directly further any legitimate state goal and are therefore constitutionally
unsustainable.
The final characteristic of grandparent visitation opinions which correlates closely
with whether or not a reviewing court will find a grandparent visitation statute
constitutional on its face' or as applied43 is the individual court's understanding of
the sources of state power. Courts which invalidate awards of grandparent visitation
on constitutional grounds recognize that all coercive state intrusions in the family are
justified only when they respond to harm or a threat of harm. These opinions
recognize, for example, that the state's parens patriae power is properly invoked only
to protect minors from harm when the minors lack fit parents or proper guardians of
their own. Courts which uphold grandparent visitation awards, on the other hand,
neither recognize nor analyze the state's legitimate sources of authority. The King
majority, for example, supports its assertion that "the [parents'] right to rear [their]
children without undue governmental interference... is not inviolate"" with a
40. Id. at 577.
41. The definitive modem statement of this standard is found in Justice O'Connor's dissent in City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Although the standard is not always expressly described in terms of conflicting constitutional interests,
as a practical matter that is the only circumstance in which it is regularly employed.
42. See, e.g., Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1995) ("The statute.., is
unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions because it does not clearly promote the
health or welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference is
authorized.").
43. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tenn. 1993) ("[]e conclude that the
application of the statute to the facts in this case violates the constitutional right to privacy in parenting
decisions.").
44. King, 828 S.W.2d at 631.
1996]
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hapless mix of exaumples that draw on exercises of patens patriae authority and of
police power without recognizing or identifying th6 threat of harm that justified them.
This article takes the position that the status of family life as a private sphere
insulated from governmental intrusion leads inevitably to the conclusion that where
fit married parent3 decide grandparent visitation is not in their offspring's best
interest, state authority provides no legitimate means of overriding that decision.
L The Family Integrity Right
At its most basic, the family integrity right arises from historical tradition and must
be understood specifically in that context,45 for the due process clause protects only
those interests "so rooted in the traditions and conscience as to be ranked as
fundamental."'
45. In the interests of accuracy, it is important to note that the role of history and tradition in
constitutional interpretation is far more complex and unsettled than the following discussion may suggest.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (invalidating Connecticut statutes that
prohibited giving advice to married people regarding contraception use and prohibited use of
contraceptives by the married couples themselves). Although agreeing on the statute's unconstitutionality,
the Griswold majority and each of the three concurrences take a different view of the proper role of
history and tradition in the analysis. Rounding out the picture, Justice Black, dissenting, comments that
although he considers the law at issue unwise and its policy ill-conceived, id. at 507 (Black, J.,
dissenting), neither history and tradition nor an examination of "basic values" can support its invalidation,
id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting). Extended discussion of the nuances of this debate is, fortunately, of
little relevance in the present context. The question presented in Griswold of whether married couples
were entitled to birth control as part of the liberty interest attaching to the marital relationship obviously
required the Court to consider how the circumstances of a distant day could be translated into a useable
constitutional jurisprudence for modem times. No such difficulty arises in the present context. Although
the legal relationship of men and women may have changed over time, the fact that history and tradition
respected the unitary family as the basis of civil society and shielded it from governmental interference
has not. Similarly, although societal changes may have extended the lives of grandparents and increased
their social role beyond any circumstance Kent and Blackstone could have imagined, grandparents
themselves are not a new phenomenon. The process of using history and tradition as a point of reference
in the analysis of grandparent visitation cases is thus a straightforward process of identifying the
boundaries of families ts established by history and tradition, the defining characteristics of the interface
of family and state and so on.
46. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989). In Michael H., the Supreme Court explained
the practical necessity of "refer[ring] to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protec-
ting ... the asserted right can be identified." Id. By identifying the history, tradition and rationale for
protecting a given right as specifically as possible, at least as a point of reference, the Court furthers the
concept of a legal system relying on the rule of law rather than depending on the predilections of the
particular decision maker. Failing to seek specific historical guidance, the Court notes, necessarily
reduces the data on A~hich judges may rely and may actually require judges to impose their own
subjective impressions on the right or interest they seek to discern. Id. at 121-22. Not coincidentally this
is also the position espoused by at least one of those sources of tradition himself. Writing in 1765, Sir
William Blackstone commented on the importance of "abid[ing] by former precedents, where the same
points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady and not liable to
waiver with every new judge's opinion; [what becomes a] permanent rule. .. it is not in the breast of





The traditional conceptualization of the family as a natural unit of society
consisting of married parents and their children permeates the writings of all early
common law commentators. This natural unit is generally treated as an essentially
private sphere of life not only with regard to the organization of the family but in
dissertations on the organization of society itself. In the writings of Lord Coke, for
example, although the formalities of entering a valid marriage may be governed by
statutory law,47 the relationship between members of the family are fundamentally
governed not by statute but by common law4 and thus by "the order and course of
nature.""9 In Lord Coke's view, for example, parents have power over their children
by the law of nature and Divine Law. The resulting conception of the family is
functionally complete and self contained as well as wholly reciprocal. Parents must
educate, maintain, and defend their children, but have an interest in the profits of
their labors. Because the interests of parent and child are reciprocal, they "may
maintain the suits of each other, and justify the defense of each other's person."'
In commentaries written a little over a hundred years later, Sir William
Blackstone affirmed the reciprocal nature of the family unit"' as well as its
fundamental importance by noting that single families "formed the first society,
among themselves."'  Dividing society into two separate spheres, Blackstone
describes the "public" sphere as all matters pertaining to King and government. In
contrast, the "private" sphere consists of an individual's family life and private
economic concerns and personal endeavors, within which Blackstone conceives the
47. LORD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 123, 127 (1628).
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 12.
50. SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 109
n.(l)(A) (J.H. Thomas, ed., Alexander Towar 2d Am. ed. 1836) (citations omitted).
51. Common law principles of family life generally, and Blackstone's writings in particular, have
occasionally been targeted as representing a paternalistic, repressive, system, to be shunned rather than
emulated. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955,
974 (1993). Such criticisms represent, at best, an unwillingness to view Common Law concepts in the
context of their own time, and, at worst, the convenient stereotypes of those who have not bothered to
read Blackstone's actual writings at all. See 1. Bohl, 'Those Privileges Long Recognized": Termination
of Parental Rights Law, the Family Right to Integrity and the Private Culture of the Family, 1 CARDozO
WOMEN'S L. J. 323, 329-33 (1994) (discussing the social context of Common Law concepts of family
life). Civil law and the "old [common] law" did allow a husband to beat his wife "for some
misdemeanors." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *432-33. Under the Common Law of Blackstone's
time, however, "the husband was prohibited to use any violence to his wife." 1 id. at *432. "[W]ith us,"
Blackstone notes, "in th6 politer reign of Charles the second ... a wife may now have security of the
peace against her husband." 1 id. at *433. Nicole Brown Simpson, it seems, might have fared better two
centuries earlier than she did when she sought the intervention of twentieth-century Brentwood police.
Indeed, the legal effect of marriage on women appears to have troubled Blackstone, moving him to
observe "that even the disabilities which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her
protection and benefit. So great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England." 1 id. This and other
sophisticated and oddly modem ruminations on legal classifications, restraints and rights should also
serve to discredit Stanley N. Katz's flippant remark that "Sir William Blackstone was undoubtedly a dull
man." Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND iii (facsimile 1st. ed. 1979) (1765).
52. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *47.
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"great relations" of private life to lie. 3 The first relation is of "Master and
Servant," and is a relationship "founded in convenience."' The second relation
is that between husband and wife, which Blackstone describes as a union "founded
in nature," and modified by "civil society."" The third "great relation," also
"founded in nature" is that of parent and child, a relationship which, for
Blackstone, is inextricably linked to the union of husband and wife by virtue of
being "consequential to []marriage... [and] it's [sic] principle end and design."'
For Blackstone, as for other common law authorities, a comprehensive set of
mutual obligations and benefits running between parents and children lie within the
realm of family life. Parents must first maintain their children, a duty imposed "not
only by nature herself' but by the parents' own "proper act" in bringing children
into the world.' Blackstone notes that although the "laws of all well regulated
states" enforce this obligation, the natural and insuperable degree of affection which
providence awakens in the "breast of every parent" accomplishes this end more
effectively than any law." Parents must also protect their children, 9 a natural duty
generally working :so strongly that municipal law is applicable more as "a check
than as a spur."6 Parents' final and most important duty is to give children "an
education suitable to their station in life,"'" for, to Blackstone's thinking, a parent
confers no "benefit upon his child by bringing him into the world [] if he afterwards
entirely neglects his culture and education and suffers him to grow up like a mere
beast."'62 As with the other obligations which run between members of a family,
Blackstone stresses that this duty arises within the private sphere of family life
rather than as a function of the external forces of government.'
For their part, the duties children owed their parents corresponded to the benefits
they received from their parents.' Before their emancipation, children owed their
parents obedience and subjection,65 just as parents owed children appropriate
guidance and education.' During their minority, children also owed their father the
benefits of their labors as long as they lived in the father's home and were
maintained by him. This obligation, too, was tempered by reciprocal parental




57. 1 id. at *435.
58. 1 id. Blackstone stresses the significance and strength of this parental impulse by adding that
"not even the deformity of person or mind, not even the wickedness, ingratitude, and rebellion of children
can totally suppress or extinguish [it]." I id.
59. 1 id. at *438.
60. 1 id. at *439.
61. lid. at *438.
62. 1 id. at *439.
63. 1 id. Indeed, Blackstone finds laws mandating education to be generally lacking in this context,
with the possible exception of provisions for apprenticeship applicable "past the age of nurture." I id.
64. 1 id. at *441.
65. 1 id.




considerations for although a father received the profits during the children's
minority, he had to account for them when the children came of age.67 When the
children reached twenty-one, the duty of obedience gave way to a duty of "honor
and reverence." Further, since parents "protected the weaknesses of [a child's]
infancy, parents were entitled to [the child's] protection in the infirmity of their
age." Again, Blackstone notes, although these obligations, like those running from
parent to child, may also be mandated by civil law, their true source lies in the
private, reciprocal relationships between parents and children.69
The archetypal family emanating from common law tradition is thus the nuclear
family. The primary assumptions concerning family life that were imported into
American jurisprudence, therefore, were first that a family consisted of a husband,
a wife, and their children. Second, as long as this primary unit was functional,"
it was defined by the web of reciprocal obligations and supportive relationships
within it. Family life occupied an exclusive, private sphere of life which the state
could neither intrude upon nor control.
In the context of grandparent visitation suits, the continued validity of the nuclear
model of family life is a key barrier to the plaintiff grandparents because what the
grandparents are really seeking is the implicit reconfiguration and expansion of the
boundaries of the family. If "family" could be divorced from the concept of the
"nuclear family," plaintiff grandparents could include themselves with parents and
children under a new definition of "family" that substituted an illegitimate lay
concept for the legal term based in history and tradition. If a court can be persuaded
to define "family" so that grandparents are appended to the nuclear family, the
outcome of the litigation is obviously set, for the common law concept of family
life as insulated from state control loses all practical significance. Parents and
children can no longer assert that a right to family integrity protects them from a
visitation order. A grandparent visitation suit under these circumstances cor-
responds, analytically, to custody and visitation disputes between divorcing parents.
With the boundaries of the family redrawn, both parents and grandparents become
part of the child's family and thus acquire the same legitimate claim to the child's
company that the child's divorcing parents would have. This attempt to reconfigure
the family would obviously have puzzled and dismayed the original common law
commentators. It is equally inconsistent, however, with the modem legal conception
of a family.
Although the common law concept of the family retains its significance and
vitality in modern constitutional jurisprudence, not all groups claiming familial
status conform to the archetype of Blackstone's day, and circumstances affecting
families may differ from anything Blackstone could have foreseen. At common law,
for example, state actions to terminate parental rights were unknown," as were
67. lid, at *441.
68. 1 id.
69. 1 id.
70. For a more comprehensive discussion of family function, particularly as that function can and
should be assessed by social service agencies, see Bohl, supra note 51.
71. Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV.
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formal adoptions and those staples of modem American society, divorce and
remarriage.' Translating the common law tradition of the family into a useable
constitutional "language" has therefore required the modem Court" to identify the
core values underlying and animating that tradition and to identify corresponding
factors characterizing family life. The first factor is a finding that the members of
the familial group were brought together by private commitments rather than by
operation of law. The second factor is a finding that biological relationships link
some members of the group. The third factor is a finding that close, ongoing
relationships have been established among members of the group, reflecting the fact
that the importance of family life lies in "the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association."'74 Collectively, these characteristics are important
in the present context not only because they demonstrate the parameters of the
205 229 (1971)
72. "Lustful, or conscience-stricken, or both, Henry VIII [who lived 1491-1547], the king with six
wives, never did obtain a divorce. Nor did anyone else, royal or no, during his reign or for 130 years
after, as divorce was unknown in England." ALLEN HORSTMAN, VICTORIAN DIVORCE 1 (1985). Indeed,
the most obvious method of ending a marriage was "simply to leave home." LAWRENCE STONE, BROKEN
LIVES: SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 1660-1857, at 18 (1993). Individuals of social standing
for whom this was an unacceptable alternative often resorted to separation by private agreement. Id. at
19. These agreements purported to settle financial obligations, set child custody and bestow the right to
remarry without fear of legal suit filed by the former spouse. Although cooperative adults could thus
acquire the practical equivalent of full divorce by mutual consent, those who entered such agreements
with spouses lacking the necessary bonhomie could find themselves with the capital offense of bigamy
at some later time, for the agreements were neither enforceable nor honored by any court of law. Those
who wanted to legally remarry and have children who were legitimate in the eyes of the law could go
through a process of filing separate suits in both civil and ecclesiastical court and then seeking an act
of Parliament. This process was so expensive and time consuming that on average only three or four
parliamentary divorces were obtained per year. Id. at 25; see also HORSTMAN, supra, at 16-17.
73. The "modem Court" can best be understood as the Unites States Supreme Court from 1937 to
the present because of the permanent change which occurred in 1937 in the Court's view of its own role
in American society. Prior to 1937, the Court's opinions reflect a tension between a long-standing
tradition ofjudicial forbearance, R.G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 137-39 (1960), and
the Court's conception of itself as guardian of the free enterprise system, required in this latter role, to
invalidate any social legislation which tended to limit freedom of contract, id. at 138-39. This tension
resulted in an uneven and inconsistent judicial response to legislation. Compare Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 556 (1934) (upholding legislative controls on the price of milk) with Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (invalidating some provisions upheld in Nebbia because issues
of interstate commerce were implicated). In the early to mid-1930s it also led to judicial invalidation of
key New Deal legislation, see, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935), and thus to President Roosevelt's
"court packing" plan. Although Roosevelt's plan for judicial reform was, of course, never implemented,
the Court, in essence, "reformed" itself. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 4.7, at 155 (5th ed. 1995). It adopted its present deferential posture with regard to social and
economic legislation, retreating from substantive review of legislation where neither fundamental rights
nor suspect classifications were implicated. See infra note 192 regarding the corresponding change in
the significance of the term "reasonable relationship" in the Court's analyses.





family but also because, by so doing, they describe the focus and scope of the
family integrity right.
The first characteristic of a family is that it must be composed of people who
have made a personal decision to live together for mutual economic and social
support. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,75 for example, Appellant Moore
challenged the validity of an ordinance that restricted occupancy of homes to
members of "family" and then defined "family" so narrowly that it prohibited her
from establishing a home that included her son and two grandsons who were
cousins rather than brothers. 6 Invalidating the ordinance as an impermissible
intrusion into the protected area of family life, the Court noted that Mrs. Moore, her
son, and her grandsons had made a personal commitment to unite in a single
household for mutual sustenance and to share "the duties and satisfactions of a
common home."'
In contrast, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas," the Court declined to find that
a group of six unrelated students acquired familial status by living together in a
rented communal house.' The owner of the house in question was cited for zoning
violations under a provision which limited occupancy to "families" and defined
"family" so that more than two people living together would not qualify unless they
were related by adoption, blood, or marriage. Describing the circumstances of the
case, the Court noted the transience of the students; all were enrolled at a nearby
college, and their numbers fluctuated even during the original eighteen-month term
of the lease."0 The Court concluded that under the circumstances presented, the
zoning restrictions implicated no fundamental rights and were, therefore, entirely
sustainable as economic and social legislation.8 A family, therefore, is rooted in
the relationships of people living together for mutual support rather than for simple
convenience.
The Court has found this indispensable characteristic of family life missing when
the group seeking familial status is both initiated by operation of state law rather
than voluntary association and remains under continuous state regulation. In Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER),' foster
parents argued that the psychological ties created with the foster children placed in
their homes should confer upon the unit thus created the status of "psychological
family," with the attendant constitutional protections accorded to families. 3 The
Court conceded that many children develop deep emotional ties with their foster
parents, and those ties do entitle them to some procedural protection from state
action." It held, however, that those emotional bonds were inherently different
75. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
76. Id. at 496.
77. Id. at 505.
78. 416 U.S. 1 (1974)
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 2-3.
81. Id. at 7-8.
82. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
83. Id. at 839.
84. After describing the existing procedural protections available to foster parents, id. at 829-32, the
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from the bonds between parent and child since they arose from "an arrangement in
which the state ha[d] been a partner from the outset."' The Court noted the unitary
family arises from the personal commitment of individuals and lies "entirely apart
from the power of the state. '" The familial interest the foster parents sought to
assert, on the other hand, "derives from a knowingly assumed contractual
relationship with the state."' The rights of foster parents, therefore, should be
ascertained from state law8" rather than from the history and tradition which inform
our understanding of the natural family.
Indeed, the absence of state oversight with regard to the details of family life is
such a defining characteristic of the family for the modem Court that the Court
regards it as indispensable, even when the group upon which oversight was imposed
could have continued to carry out other typically familial activities. In Stanley v.
Illinois,' for example, an unwed father challenged a state law which, in pertinent
part, defined "parents" as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the
survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child."' The father,
Stanley, had lived with his children and their mother for eighteen years. Upon the
mother's death, Stanley's children were declared wards of the state and removed
from his home on the theory that as an unwed father he was not a "legal parent"
under state law.
The Court first rejected the state's theory that any detriment Stanley suffered was
not legally cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment since Stanley could have
petitioned the courn for "custody and control" of the children.9' The Court observed
that even apart from the illogic of suggesting that an unmarried father "without
funds and already once presumed unfit" could prevail on such a petition, legal
guardianship is not equivalent to the status of a parent.' As a legal guardian,
Stanley would be subject to continuing judicial supervision. A state court could
require him to report on his handling of the children's affairs," for example, and
in the event that bis judgment is found wanting, the court could remove him as
guardian without the procedural protections available to a parent in a neglect
proceeding.' The distinction for the Court was thus the loss of autonomy and the
issue of state control. If the state had become a silent partner in the lives of Stanley
and his children, no family could have really existed at all. State intrusion into
family life is not merely inconsistent with the concept of a family as a private
sphere of life, it is literally contrary to a definition of the family itself.
Court concluded that "those procedures satisfy constitutional standards," id. at 849.
85. Id. at 845.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 845.
88. Id.
89. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
90. Id. at 650.
91. Id. at 647.
92. Id. at 648.
93. Id. at 649.




As Stanley itself suggests, a second familial characteristic the Court has identified
is the presence of some blood relationship between some members of a household.
Thus, some of Stanley's familial rights arise from the fact that the state sought to
separate him from the children he had "sired"95 as well as "raised."'  Similarly,
Moore's household acquires some constitutionally significant familial status, in part
because of the degree to which its members are related." For present purposes,
however, the familial characteristic of some blood relationship may be as important
for what it does not signify as for what it does signify. Although blood relationships
are clearly significant in any analysis of family-like groups, the specific blood
relationship of "grandparent" has no special significance at all.
The Court's holding in Moore, for example, that a grandmother living with her
son and grandson was entitled to some familial status and the corresponding
constitutional protection from state intrusion9' is sometimes erroneously interpreted
to signify the Court's willingness to expand the constitutional definition of "family"
to include grandparents." The Court does, indeed, specifically note how the
members of Moore's household are related." The Court also alludes to the
tradition of the extended family sharing a household... and comments that state
power is limited when it acts to deny "relatives in this degree of kinship"'" the
choice of living together. The real significance, however, of the blood relationships
in Moore's household is not limited to, or even focused upon, the specific genetic
connections present. Grandparents or other relatives," the Court notes, may often
draw together to "participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common
home." 0  They do so for "mutual sustenance"' 5 and support and, as part of an
interdependent household, may share child-rearing decisions. Indeed, once it
identifies a blood relationship, the Court immediately looks past it to the respon-
sibilities and commitments the members of the group have assumed." Although
the Court finds Moore's blood tie to those with whom she lives characteristic of a
family, her specific status as a grandparent is not more significant, in and of itself,
than any other genetic connection.
95. Id. at 651.
96. Id.
97. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99, 504.
98. Id. at 494.
99. See, e.g., Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearing Before
the Subcomn. on Human Services of the House of Representative Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong.
77 (1982) (statement of Judith Areen, Professor of Law and Professor of Community and Family
Medicine, Georgetown University, Georgetown University Medical Center); Judith L. Shandling, Note,
The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L REV. 118, 129, 132
(1986).
100. Moore, 431 U.S. at 496.
101. Id at 504.
102. Id at 505-06.
103. Id. at 504.
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The Court's functional analysis of Moore's household illustrates the third and final
factor it has identified as characteristic of a family; for the Court, the presence of
relationships rooted in the "intimac[ies] of daily association"'" dominate any
analysis of quasi-familial groups. However necessary it may be to inquire into the
origins of family-like groups or seek out blood relationships between members, for
the Court, Moore's household is most fundamentally family-like because of the
ongoing daily interaction of the individuals living within it. The Court notes, for
example, that Moore's grandson John lost his mother and came to live with his
grandmother to provide a "substitute for his mother's care."'" The concurring
opinion notes that the grandsons have, in essence, a "sibling" relationship and that
for John, Moore is "the only maternal influence that he has had during his entire
life."'" Moore's household was a family because ongoing, interdependent
relationships and the cumulative details of shared life made it so.
Similarly, in OFFER, the Court expressly affirmed the enormous significance of
the daily contact between a child and the child's caretaker,"' even though it held
that the status of a foster family was ultimately limited by its contractual origins in
state law."' In the foster care system, the Court noted, foster parents provided for
"the child's daily needs... feed[ing] him, provid[ing] shelter, put[ting] him to bed,
send[ing] him to school, see[ing] that he washes his face and brushes his teeth."..
Over time, the Court noted, this relationship would make the foster family not
merely important in the emotional life of the foster child but so important that, in
this particular respect, the foster family would be functionally the same as a natural
family."'
Perhaps nowhere in constitutional jurisprudence is the Court's emphasis on the
relational nature of the family thrown into sharper relief than in a synthesis of the
four cases the Court has heard concerning the familial rights of unwed fathers. In
two of the cases, the unwed fathers seeking to retain parental rights to their children
were active participants in ongoing relationships with those children. In two they
were not. So significant was the presence or absence of an active parent-child
relationship to the Court's analysis that the outcome of each case literally turned on
that factor.
In the first case, Stanley, an unwed father living with his children, argued that he
was entitled to retain parental rights to his children after their mother died, despite
a state statute which defined "parent" to exclude unwed fathers." 4 Stanley had
lived intermittently with his children and their mother for eighteen years."' The
107. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform [OFFER], 431 U.S. 816, 844
(1977).
108. Moore. 431 U.S. at 505 n.16.
109. Id. at 506 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 836.
111. Id. at 845.
112. Id. at 827 n.17 (citing ALFRED KADUSHIN. CHILD WELFARE SERVICEs 354-55 (1967)),
113. Id. at 844.
114. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).




Court agreed with Stanley, holding that the family integrity right protects the
familial bond between a man and the children he has "sired and raised.""' 6 The
Court stressed the relational nature of familial rights by noting that the challenged
procedure had actually invaded an intact family to separate a father from his
children."7
In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court amplified its focus on the relational nature
of family rights by recognizing a constitutionally significant parental interest where
a father who no longer lived with his children nevertheless managed to maintain a
consistent, if clandestine, relationship with them."9 Caban initially lived with his
children's mother and participated in the children's upbringing. Caban's situation
differed from Stanley's, however, in that the children's mother moved out, taking
the children with her. Through his own mother and his mother-in-law, Caban
arranged to continue an active parental relationship with the children; all arran-
gements were apparently made without the mother's knowledge." When the
mother and her new husband sought to adopt the children, Caban tried unsuccessful-
ly to block the adoption in state court. He ultimately prevailed on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, however. the Court specifically found that Caban
had a "substantial" parental relationship with his children which gave rise to
constitutionally protected familial rights.' The Court noted that Caban not only
lived with them during their earliest years but contributed to their support. It
concluded that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the Caban children - aged 4
and 6 at the time of the adoption proceeding - had a relationship with their mother
unrivaled by the affection and concern of their father."'" The fact that arran-
gements to see the children had been clandestine did not affect the Court's
conclusion at all; the existence of a parent-child relationship was the defining
factor."z
The Court's reasoning in the two cases in which the biological fathers could not
show a substantial parental relationship also demonstrates the relational nature of
a family and of familial rights. In both Quilloin v. Walcott" and Lehr v.
Robertson," the unwed fathers tried to block"z or to invalidate 7 their
children's adoption by the new husband of each child's biological mother. In both
cases each child lived with his respective biological mother and her new hus-
band; neither child had ever lived with his biological father. In both cases, the
116. Il at 651.
117. Id. at 650.
118. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
119. Id. at 382.
120. Id. at 383.
121. Id. at 388.
122. Id. at 389.
123. Id. at 389 n.7, 393 n.14.
124. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
125. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
126. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
127. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
128. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 252-53; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 n.19.
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unwed fathers tried, in effect, to challenge the teaching of Stanley, amplified in
Caban, that familial rights are purely relational rights. In each case the biological
father took the position that although he had no actual parental relationship with his
child on which constitutional protection could be premised, the Court should find
that he had an individual right to constitutional protection of his potential
relationship with his child." In each case, the father's arguments were resoun-
dingly unsuccessful.
The Court's characterization of family rights as relational foreclosed both fathers'
claims. For the Couirt, where no relationship exists, there is nothing to protect.
Rejecting Quilloin's claim, for example, the Court pointed out that Quilloin had
"never exercised actual or legal custody over his child and thus had never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision,
education, protection, or care of the child.""' Interestingly, the Court rejects Lehr's
claim on the same theory, even in the face of evidence that the child's mother had
thwarted Lehr's attempts to establish a relationship with the child by moving
frequently and keeping her new addresses secret."' Whatever the perceived
unfairness of denying familial rights to one who would have been willing to actively
parent a child, the rule is clear. Familial rights are relational rights, not the
individual interests of either parent or child.
These judicially recognized characteristics of a family are especially significant
in an analysis of open-ended grandparent visitation statutes because these
characteristics dictate the proper relationship between the family and the state and
thus illuminate the full scope of the family integrity right. The family integrity right
obviously protects the family when state action threatens to remove children or
terminate a parental right. But since the family is a private sphere of life, formed
from personal commitments apart from state control and characterized by a web of
interdependent relationships, the family integrity right necessarily protects against
lesser intrusions as well. The state may not intrude on family functioning even to
a minor degree. It may not, for example, dismiss a potential loss of familial
autonomy as negligible and therefore permissible as it sought to in Stanley by
arguing that the status of legal guardian should be a satisfactory alternative to one
who had been a father for eighteen years."' The state also may not intrude on
family functioning even to further some otherwise desirable goal. It may not, for
example, require a child to attend school past the seventh grade, where the totality
of circumstances render such attendance inimical to family functioning and
community culture, as it sought to in Wisconsin v. Yoder," although a fully
educated citizenry is certainly a laudable goal. It stands to reason, therefore, that,
consistent with the family integrity right, the state may not invade an intact family
129. See Quilloin, 414 U.S. at 253-54; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-50.
130. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
131. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
132. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).




by means of a grandparent visitation order, no matter how brief the visitation
periods or how desirable the goals of intergenerational contact.
Courts which find grandparent visitation statutes unconstitutional as applied to
intact families interpret the family integrity right in exactly this comprehensive
manner, recognizing its full scope and the nature of the underlying family rights
themselves both directly in their express holdings and indirectly in their
interpretation of the legal significance of the parties' conduct. In Hawk v. Hawk,"M
for example, the underlying dispute included the parents' objection to the
grandparents' means of punishing the children and the length of the trips on which
the grandparents had taken the children.'35 The trial court made a generous award
of visitation to the grandparents. It then stated that the grandparents were free to
"take the children anywhere they please"'" and were held to no other restrictions
"because the Court is fully convinced that they would not do anything or take these
children anywhere that would adversely affect these children,"'37 essentially
depriving the parents of a dimension of the right to define their family group.
Reversing the lower court, the Hawk court quoted this particular portion of the
lower court's opinion, commenting that such interference represented "a virtually
unprecedented intrusion into a protected sphere of family life."'38 The court noted
that a grandparent visitation suit against fit parents differed fundamentally from a
situation in which parental unfitness required the state to redraw the boundaries of
a family group or assess and reorder its relationships. By characterizing the family
as a "private realm,"'39 the court not only recognized the essential right of a family
to define itself and order its affairs free of any state interference but correctly
characterized the right at issue as one which extended beyond any specific child-
rearing decision to encompass the parent's general right to "the custody, companion-
ship and care of the child"'' and "all of the consequences that naturally follow
from [that] relationship."''
Other opinions invalidating awards of grandparent visitation on constitutional
grounds have expressed a similarly comprehensive understanding of the family's
right to be free of state interference. In both Brooks v. Parkerson42 and Lingo v.
Kelsay,'43 for example, the courts recognized a broad right of parents to the
uninterrupted custody of their children. Quoting earlier Georgia case law, Brooks
noted that "the right to the custody and control of one's child is a fiercely guarded
134. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
135. Id. at 576.
136. Id. at 577.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 579.
140. Id. at 577 (quoting State ex rel. Bethell v. Kilvington, 45 S.W. 433, 435 (Tenn. 1898)).
141. Id. at 578 (quoting In re Knott, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (Tenn. 1917)). The Hawk court thus
correctly conceptualized the family right to be free of state interference not only as a broad,
comprehensive right, but as an organizing principle within American jurisprudence, inextricably linked
to all concepts of privacy embodied in the United States Constitution.
142. 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995).
143. 651 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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right in our society and in our law."'" The court also emphasized the reciprocal,
relational nature of the right by observing that "the law's concept of the family rests
on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and
capacity for judgment."'" To explain the scope of this right to autonomous child-
rearing, Brooks, like Hawk, invoked federal constitutional jurisprudence to find the
right extending fiom the constitution's comprehensive concept of privacy."
Similarly, Lingo rejecied the petitioning grandparent's assertion that the hypothetical
benefits of visitation could constitute the statutory "extraordinary circumstances"''
under which visitation could be ordered and state interference justified. After noting
that no other statutory provision had been satisfied, the court simply asserted the
broad principle that "[i]t is well settled that the right of parents to custody of their
children is paramount.'
4
State cases which uphold the constitutionality of open-ended grandparent
visitation laws, on the other hand, all conceptualize the family integrity right as a
far more limited right which does not, therefore, require invalidation of open-ended
grandparent visitation statutes. Those courts reach this conclusion by following one
of two related lines of reasoning. First, courts may simply describe the family
integrity right itself as essentially limited and limitable. The court in Herndon v.
Tuhey149 states, for example, that the "[c]onstitutional right [to autonomous child-
rearing] is not absolute.""' Similarly, although the court in King v. King...
concedes that "the Constitution, as interpreted by the various courts, does recognize
the right to rear children without undue governmental interference," it notes that that
right is not inviolate.' For other courts, this conceptualization is not expressly
articulated but, instead, is implied in the conclusion that a legislature can properly
enact an open-ended grandparent visitation statute. In Fairbanks v. McCarter,'53
for example, the grandparents were denied visitation when a lower court interpreted
Maryland's open-ended grandparent visitation statute to include a requirement that
"special circumstances" be shown."5 Overruling the lower court, the Maryland
Court of Appeals commented that visitation is a considerably less weighty matter
144. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 772.
145. Id. (quoting Il re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984)).
146. Id.
147. Lingo, 651 So. 2d at 500.
148. Id. For the court, the only circumstances sufficiently "extraordinary" to justify the state
intervention of forced visitation would be inadequate parental care. The court notes that the parental right
of custody "is outweighed only by a showing of sufficiently great detriment to the child's best interest,"
See discussion of sources of state authority to intrude on familial autonomy infra notes 298-393 and
accompanying text.
149. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
150. Id. at 207.
151. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
152. Id. at 631.
153. 622 A.2d 121 (Md. 1993).




than outright custody'55 and upheld the validity of the statute without much further
discussion."
Under a second line of reasoning, the reviewing state court in question
acknowledges the full panoply of familial rights as articulated by the United States
Supreme Court but simply finds grandparent visitation permissible because it is not
an intrusion of sufficient magnitude to implicate any right to familial autonomy.
The Herndon court, a principal architect of this perspective, meticulously traces the
development of the concept of family integrity through the key United States
Supreme Court cases,' acknowledging that "parents have a constitutional right to
make decisions affecting the family."'5 8 It concedes, further, that an award of
grandparent visitation is an "intrusion.'' 59 The court holds, however, that the
grandparent visitation statute is constitutional because an infringement is
constitutionally significant only at a certain "magnitude"'" which, the court notes,
has not been reached.
The practical difficulty in distinguishing between a great intrusion on family life
and a small one is illustrated by the Herndon court's failure to suggest any bright
line test at all. The Herndon court and all those to subsequently follow it simply
assert that "visitation rights by grandparents ... are less than a substantial
encroachment on a family.'' Indeed, any attempt to state such a test would
almost certainly be doomed to failure since the effect of a grandparent visitation
award on the parent-child relationship mirrors attempts at state intrusion struck
down by key Supreme Court decisions. In Meyer v. Nebraska," Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,' and Wisconsin v. Yoder,"M for example, the Court found state
education laws unconstitutional where those laws infringed upon a parent's right to
direct her child's education and to oversee the child's experiences and upbringing
generally.65 In Meyer, the state sought to ensure children a thorough grounding
in the English language by prohibiting instruction in any modem foreign language
until the child finished eighth grade." In Pierce, the state sought to compel
attendance in public as opposed to private schools,'67 and in Yoder, the state
sought to compel Amish children to attend public school until they were sixteen. "
In each case, the Court noted the valid state interest in an educated and patriotic
155. Id. at 126.
156. Id.
157. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207-08.
158. Id. at 208.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 209.
161. Id.; see also R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (quoting Herndon,
857 S.W.2d at 209).
162. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
163. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
164. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
165. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35.
166. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
167. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
168. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
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citizenry" but found the laws in question impermissible because each diverted
some of the responsibility for the child's upbringing away from its proper source in
the parents. 7 ' Similarly, removing a child from his parents' company through an
award of grandparent visitation necessarily deprives the parents of some of their role
in directing the child's upbringing.
Sometimes this interference is direct and explicit. The parents in Hawk, for
example, wanted to determine how their children would be disciplined; the
grandparents would not defer to their decisions. On other occasions the interference
surfaces simply by necessary implication:
Some parents and judges will not care if children are physically
disciplined by the grandparents; some parents and judges will not care
if the grandparents teach children a religion inconsistent with the
parents' religion; some judges and parents will not care if the children
are exposed to or taught racist beliefs or sexist beliefs; ... But some
parents and some judges will care. Between the two, the parents should
be the ones to choose not to expose their children to certain people or
ideas . . .
In either event, the intrusion on the parents' interest in directing their children's
upbringing is different neither in kind nor quality from the intrusions the Court has
specifically disapproved.
In essence, then, these judicial attempts to create subcategories of direct state
intrusions on family life, labeling some small and permissible and others great and
impermissible, logically fails simply because of the nature of the family integrity
right itself. Family life consists of, and is defined by, the relationships within it. It
cannot be divided into discrete lists of rights, claimable individually by parent or
child; direct intrusions by state authority cannot be dismissed as deminimus simply
because they are less than other direct intrusions. Grandparent visitation cases which
nevertheless struggle to discern such an artificial distinction often cite the
termination of parental rights case of Santosky v. Kramer," arguing that the sheer
scope and permanence of a termination action sets it apart from the more modest
169. See Meyer, 252 U.S. at 401 ("Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution - a desirable end cannot by promoted by prohibited means."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 ("No
question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend
some school ...."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 ("Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State.").
170. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 ("No emergency has arisen which [justifies state limitation on
teaching of modem foreign languages] with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed,");
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that a law prohibiting attendance at private or parochial schools
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control").
171. King, 82$ S.W.2d at 635 (Lambert, J., dissenting) (quoting Kathleen Bean, Grandparent
Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 U. Lou. J. FAM. L. 393 (1985)) (first omission in original).




or temporary intrusions at issue in other family rights cases - and from any
grandparent visitation case.' Santosky involved parents whose parental rights to
three of their children had been terminated on the statutory grounds of "permanent
neglect." The Santosky parents successfully challenged the statute under a theory
that familial bonds could not constitutionally be severed upon proof of neglect
established only by a preponderance of the evidence." By its own terms,
however, Santosky does not limit the constitutional significance of the parent-child
relationship to situations where permanent severance is at issue;75 indeed, its dicta
is quite to the contrary. Reviewing the constitutional interest at stake, the Court
comments that the Santoskys' interest in "the care custody and management"'76 of
their children is of such overriding importance that it is still significant, despite the
fact that the Santoskys have not been "model parents.'"" Even in the shadow of
the "awesome intrusion" which a termination action represents, it is the day to day
contact between parents and child, and the relationships grounded in that ordinary
round of daily life which demand the Court's attention.
Although no logical basis exists in either the concept of "family," or in the nature
of the family integrity right for grandparent visitation cases to distinguish great
intrusions from small, the distinction these courts have created is hardly random.
A clue to their real basis for determining the "magnitude" of an intrusion, as well
as the reason that this basis is not expressly articulated in any majority opinion, can
be found in the Herndon dissent. Discussing the grandparent visitation approved by
the majority, Justice Covington describes the level of intrusion as "far from
insignificant" and notes that "[a]llowing the government to force upon an unwilling
family a third party even when the third party happens to be a grandparent, is a
significant intrusion into the integral family unit."'78 This is, of course, exactly
what the majority opinion has done; it has expressly endorsed significant forcible
invasions of functional families. Equally clear, however, is the fact that this is not
at all what the majority thinks its opinion has done. For example, the majority
reviews the United States Supreme Court's family integrity cases and states that the
statutory grandparent visitation rights at issue are, in contrast, a "less than
substantial encroachment of a family."'" The majority then comments on the
rationale for a grandparent visitation statute: "One of [its] main purposes ... is to
prevent a family quarrel of little significance to [sic] disrupt a relationship which
should be encouraged rather than destroyed .... [I]t is not unreasonable for the state
to say that the development of a loving relationship between family members is
173. See, e.g., Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209; Pollard v. Pollard, No. 532463, 1995 WL 534244, at
*5-*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1995); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13, 15-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994)
(citing Herndon's distinction between termination of parental rights cases and lesser encroachments).
174. Santosk3, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
175. Id. at 753 (noting that the parents' "fundamental liberty interest" lies in "the care, custody and
management of their child," not simply physical custody or avoidance of "forced dissolution").
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 209.
19961
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
desirable .... '"' That said, the majority concludes that the grandparent visitation
statute at issue is "reasonable both because it contemplates only a minimal intrusion
on the family relalionship and because it is narrowly tailored to adequately protect
the interests of parents and children."''
The majority is obviously no longer treating the issue of grandparent visitation
as an issue of family autonomy, although it has been using the terminology of a
family rights analysis and referring to the key United States Supreme Court cases
defining these rights." For the majority, the identities of the litigants have
blurred. At some roints in its discussion the majority properly treats the parents and
children as the family, at other points it has implicitly redrawn the boundaries of the
family unit to include grandparents.'83 The majority does not and probably cannot
explain that these shifts have dictated its conclusion; they are neither legally
defensible nor, apparently, the product of conscious analysis.
This confusion of parties and blurring of the boundaries of the family, with its
consequent misstatement of the constitutional concept of "family," characterizes all
opinions which find grandparent visitation awards constitutionally permissible."'
In R.T. v. J.E.," f or example, the court cites King approvingly for the idea that
grandparent visitation statutes are permissible "to advance loving relations among
families."'" Similarly, in Campbell v. Campbell,"' the court notes that
"grandparents are members of the extended family"; the grandparent visitation
statute merely "give[s] added meaning" to this fact. 8 Even courts that uphold
grandparent visitation awards without any express discussion of family autonomy
at all often reveal their own underlying confusion regarding the constitutional
180. Id. (quoting King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992))
181. Id. at 210.
182. See, e.g., id. at 209.
183. Compare id. at 207-08 ("The Tuheys [parents] contend that they have a constitutional right to
raise their children as they see fit, free form state intrusion.... Of course this Constitutional right is not
absolute.") with id. at 209 ("There is no reason a petty dispute between afather [referring to the plaintiff]
and son [referring to the defendant] should be allowed to deprive a grandparent and grandchild of the
unique relationship that ordinarily exists between these individuals. One of the main purposes of the
statute is to prevent a family quarrel of little significance to disrupt a relationship which should be
encouraged rather than destroyed.") (emphasis added).
184. Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995) is an exception to this general pattern, and
its pronouncements serve to expressly articulate what is merely implied in decisions following the
Herndon pattern just described. Although Michael did not involve suit against an intact family, most of
its discussion makes no such distinction. The Michael court first notes that it cannot find "much
discussion in the authorities [regarding] the rights of grandparents and grandchildren to associate (as
family members]." Id. at 1150. Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Lambert could succinctly explain why.
See supra note 281 and accompanying text. The Michael court then asserts that the "right to associate
with one's family" is a fundamental right under the Wyoming constitution. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1147.
It identifies the purported "precious[ness]" of grandparent-grandchild relationships as a sufficiently
significant indice of family status, id. at 1150, and thus finds that coerced grandparent visitation is not
only constitutionally prmissible, but constitutes a compelling state interest, id. at 1151.
185. 650 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
186. Id. at 15.
187. 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).




concept of "family" and the status of grandparents. In Fairbanks v. McCarter, for
example, the court comments that grandparent visitation statutes are generally
unnecessary because children see grandparents through "the customary interac-
tion""S with them; the court unthinkingly assumes the same pattern of ongoing
conduct one might expect to find between a parent and child.
Despite numerous citations and a full panoply of family integrity terminology,
then, these cases make no actual comparison between a grandparent visitation suit
and the circumstances underlying cases in which the United States Supreme Court
has invalidated legislation as violative of familial rights. Instead, these courts
unthinkingly confuse the constitutional concept of "family" with a vague lay view
found only in their imaginations or in their personal experiences.' Grandparents
thus become unstated quasi-family members; since the judge perceives them to be
already included in the family unit, the "magnitude of the intrusion" appears minor
indeed.
I. Standard of Review
Courts that review open-ended grandparent visitation statutes with a flawed and
incomplete perception of the family integrity right itself and an unrecognized
confusion concerning the legal relationship of petitioning grandparents to respondent
parents' family unit perhaps predictably apply the most lenient standard of review
possible."' By applying the most lenient incarnation of rational basis review,'
189. Fairbanks v. Mc Carter, 622 A.2d 121, 127 (Md. 1993).
190. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 633 (Lambert, J. dissenting) ("[The majority opinion] depends
entirely on the sentimental notion of an inherent value in visitation between grandparent and
grandchild ...").
191. All grandparent visitation statutes implicate the family integrity right; ensuing litigation thus
focuses on the substantive reach of a grandparent visitation statute rather than on any classifications of
people it creates. Although grandparent visitation cases thus involve substantive due process challenges
to the statutes at issue, the standard of review applicable to a due process challenge is to be found in
both the United States Supreme Court's due process cases and in its equal protection cases. During the
Court's modem em, see supra note 73, it has employed an equal protection analysis far more frequently
than it has employed a due process analysis. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 73, § 11.4, at 383. This
does not result from any theoretical preference for equal protection analysis over due process analysis,
but rather reflects the fact that most laws operate by classifying people in some way. Id. Thus, the Court
will generally examine a constitutional challenge to economic and social regulation, for example, to
decide whether the distinctions that it draws between groups of people are rationally related to a
legitimate interest of the government rather than examining it to decide if it is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. Id. Similarly, if the Court is facing a challenge to regulations affecting
fundamental rights and determines that the regulations affect only one group of people it strictly
scrutinizes the classification thus created to determine if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest. If, on the other hand, the regulation affecting a fundamental right affects everyone's ability
to exercise that right the Court will strictly scrutinize the regulation to determine if it is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest. Id. Regardless of whether analysis has proceeded under the equal
protection clause or the due process clause, therefore, the standard of review the Court has developed
is identical. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308 (1993) ("[Respondents' next contention] is just
the 'substantive due process' argument recast in 'procedural due process' terms, and we reject it for the
same reasons."); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
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furthermore, these courts are easily able to find open-ended grandparent visitation
statutes constitutional.93 This lenient rational basis review first presumes the
validity of a legislative enactment by placing the burden on those challenging the
law to demonstrate that it is "essentially arbitrary."'" Although it does not
specifically so state, the Fairbanks court thus commences a rational basis review
when its analysis of a grandparent visitation statute focuses on the words of the
statute itself.95 The court's assumption is that if the "ordinary and natural import"
of the words" makes sense, the statute is valid."9 Similarly, the Herndon court
commences its rational basis review of Missouri's grandparent visitation statute by
remarking that it must "begin [its] analysis with the presumption that [the
grandparent visitation statute] is constitutional.' 98
This lenient inczanation of rational basis review then requires only that the statute
at issue have "any reasonable basis;" a reviewing court will find a statute
U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In this article, therefore, no distinction
is made between a definition of "rational basis review," which is articulated in an equal protection case,
and a definition of "rational basis review," articulated in a due process case.
192. A significant number of courts and commentators agree that rational basis review has involved
varying degrees of judicial scrutiny rather that a single clear standard. In United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, listed 11 U.S.
Supreme Court cases which had applied a rational basis standard of review and commented: "The most
arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test under
equal protection principles." Id. at 176 n.10; see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
451-52 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the term "rational" and the "continuum of judicial
responses" reflected in the Court's decisional process.); United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 449 U.S. at
182-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTrONAL LAW 472 (1985); Robert Jerome
Glennon, Taxation ani Equal Protection, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261 (1990).
193. In a curious misuse of terminology, the King majority quotes Meyer for the proposition that
the state may interfere with the liberty interest underlying family autonomy when the legislation at issue
bears a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the competence of the state to effect." King, 828
S.W.2d at 632 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)). Clearly the King majority intended
to demonstrate that the lenient rational relationship standard as articulated by the modem Court is a
sufficiently demanding standard of review where, as in Meyer, family life is affected by state action. This
is in fact, what Meyer appears to state. The King majority's error lies in its failure to recognize that
Meyer and its terminology are rooted in a philosophically and semantically different judicial era. During
this period, the Lochner era stretching from 1900 to 1937, the Court interpreted its role as one of
protecting Americans and American business from burgeoning economic and social regulation. NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 73. One of the Court's primary means of doing so was through application of
a substantive due process test to all challenged legislation. This test required the government to establish
that the legislation at issue bore a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental goal. Since the Court
conceived of the government's proper role in society as extremely limited, its substantive due process
analyses resulted in the invalidation of hundreds of laws. Read in their proper historical context,
therefore, the words the King majority quotes from Meyer actually state a standard of review which is
ironically similar to the modem standard of strict scrutiny which the King majority seeks to avoid.
194. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911).
195. Fairbanks, 622 A.2d at 125.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 125-26.




constitutional if any conceivable factual circumstance could justify it.99 King
illustrates this approach with its extensive discussion of possible legislative motives
for enactment of Kentucky's open-ended grandparent visitation statute.w The court
notes that
the grandparents' visitation statute [is] an appropriate response to the
change in the demographics of domestic relations, mirrored by the
dramatic increase in the divorce rate and in the number of children born
to unmarried parents, and the increasing independence and alienation
within the extended family inherent in a mobile society.
The lenient rational basis standard the court is applying requires neither evidence
that its hypothesis corresponds to any actual findings in the statute's legislative
history nor that any such circumstances actually existed at the time of
enactment?2' The King court's speculation thus supports its conclusion that the
Kentucky statute is rationally based and therefore constitutional despite the fact that
in the case before it the statute is being applied to an intact family whose members
have neither contributed to the cited increase in divorce nor produced any
illegitimate children.
The King court's uncritical approval of the legislative motives it has hypothesized
appears to allow it to approve any resulting imposition whatsoever on the grounds
that it is not only rationally based but accompanied by procedural protection. The
court notes that an action must be filed in circuit court and a hearing conducted with
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered into the record. ° These for-
malities "preclude either injustice or an unwarranted intrusion into the fundamental
liberty of the parents and child."'  Good motives, it seems, necessarily produce
permissible laws when they are accompanied by procedural formality. Applying the
King court's understanding of rational basis review, a grandparent visitation award
which separated a child from her own fit parents for half of her waking life would
be acceptable if proper procedures were followed first.' 5 The theoretical virtues
199. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
200. King, 828 S.W.2d at 632.
201. Id. at 632 (quoting Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Ky. 1989)).
202. Id. (describing sentimentalized and unsupported generalities concerning grandparents and
grandchildren as "considerations by the state").
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. This particular aspect of its own grandparent visitation statute did, however, appear to concern
the Herndon court, thereby forcing upon it the logically troubling problem of reigning in potentially
limitless awards of visitation without recognizing any parental right which might, in turn, cast doubt on
the constitutional validity of the statute. See Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Mo. 1993) (en
bane). The Herndon court's solution was to focus on the fact that the statute permitted an award of
visitation only after the grandparent was "unreasonabl[y] deni[ed]" contact with the minor grandchild for
at least 90 days. Id. at 210. This 90-day prerequisite, the court concluded, was an indication that any
visitation under the statute should not attempt to approximate the amount of voluntary contact which had
occurred at an earlier time and should not be commensurate with the amount of parental visitation
awarded in custody matters. Id. Although the discerning reader may find this implied limitation on
1996]
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of a grandparent/grandchild relationship thus provide the court with both the rational
basis for the law and the substantive limits, or more accurately, absence of limits
on grandparent visitation.
Although courts using this form of rational basis review are easily able to find
open-ended grandparent visitation statutes constitutional, it is by no means clear that
they could do so under the United States Supreme Court's alternative and more
rigorous formulation of this standard.' Under the Court's alternate concep-
tualization of rational basis review, the term "rational basis" describes a certain level
of analysis required rather than describing the form of judicial review applied by
King and its progeny2" in which assumptions and hypotheses can provide any
justification needed. Application of this different approach to rational basis review
would alter even the approach taken to the statutory language itself by a grandparent
visitation decision. State courts which find open-ended grandparent visitation
statutes constitutional could no longer simply conclude that since the words of the
statute express a plain meaning the statute is constitutional on the grounds that
"[b]oth the language and the purpose of the statute are clear."2 Contrasting this
more demanding analysis, which he describes as "traditional" rational basis
review," ' with the extremely deferential approach, Justice Brennan has observed
that courts deviating from traditional rational basis analysis reduce judicial review
visitation awards a rather weighty matter to be sustained by such a slender thread of logic, the court
apparently did too. After setting up its comparison between an award of visitation and the statutory
reference to a 90-day period the court simply asserted that its interpretation "is based in part on the fact
that if the statute allowed a great amount of visitation we would be more likely to ... hold that [the
statute is] unconstitutioial." Id. at 210-11. This is the proper interpretation, in other words, because it
is the necessary one.
206. This conclusion is consistent with the conclusions generally reached under the most lenient
incarnation of rational tasis review. Under this standard, a statute may be sufficiently rational to satisfy
the constitution even though it results in some inequity. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911).
207. Professor Galloway has subdivided rational basis review into two categories which recognize
the different conceptualizations of the standard, describing them as the "deferential rational basis test"
and the "nondeferential rational relation test." Russel W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American
Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REv 449, 451 (1988). Although the Court itself has not expressly
acknowledged different tiers of rational basis review, it has repeatedly recognized and often disapproved
the different faces ratioial basis review can have. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 186 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See aLvo infra note 192. Somejustices have further contributed
to the difficulties of isolating a single rational basis standard by suggesting that all constitutional review
is rational. These justices suggest that differences in the level of scrutiny applied are better explained
by examining the interests at stake than by attempting to identify specific analytical tiers. See Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190,212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
208. Several cases have expressly followed King with regard to the form of judicial review. See
Pollard v. Pollard, No. 532463, 1995 WL 534244, at *9-*10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1995); Hemdon
v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209-10 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1994).
209. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 622 A.2d 121, 125 (Md. 1993).




to a tautology.2"1 His dry comment regarding the effect of this analysis in the
context of pension legislation would provide an equally appropriate condemnation
of an open-ended grandparent visitation statute: "[ilt may always be said that [a
legislative body] intended to do what it in fact did."2"'
As Brennan's comment regarding the tautology implicit in such minimal review
suggests, traditional rational basis analysis rejects such circular reasoning and
rootless assumptions as justifications for legislative enactments, requiring, instead,
specific factual support for any determination that a rational basis exists. Thus,
although a court applying traditional rational basis review may favor the legislature's
understanding of the specific circumstances it sought to address, the court may not
overlook those specific circumstances themselves in order to reach a conclusion
based only on general pronouncements.213 The Court's analysis of the circumstan-
ces underlying the challenged ordinance in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Centert illustrates this rejection of general statements to justify a statutory
classification when those statements cannot be supported by the available data. In
Cleburne, respondent Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) endeavored to open a
group home for the mentally retarded. It was required to obtain a special permit,
even though no such special permit would have been required had the group home
been a "hospital[], sanitarium[:, nursing home[] or homeol for convalescents or
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts, 215
or, indeed, had it been one of a host of other social and institutional facilities.2"6
After CLC submitted the required special permit, a public hearing was held, and the
City Council voted to deny the permit. CLC filed suit,217" arguing that the zoning
ordinance at issue "discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the
equal protection rights of CLC and its potential residents.""2 Although the United
States Supreme Court disagreed with the contention that mental retardation
constituted a quasi-suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny, it never-
211. Id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (stating that "the mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme"); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-13
(1977); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1974) (upholding legislation because Congress had
expressly recognized the resulting distinctions and those specific distinctions were rationally related to
the Congressional purpose); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (holding
that rational basis review is satisfied only when legislation "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated
state purpose").
214. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
215. Id. at 436 n.3 (emphasis omitted).
216. See id.
217. Id. at 437 (CLC lost in district court, won in the court of appeals, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984)).
218. Id. Although CLC raised an equal protection challenge, the analysis of the applicable standard
of review is the same regardless of whether the challenge is rooted in the equal protection clause or the
due process clause. See supra note 191.
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theless invalidated the ordinance by finding that under the circumstances it bore no
rational relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose.219
The Cleburne Court's application of rational basis review stands in sharp contrast
to the approach taken in grandparent visitation cases, for the Cleburne Court
engages in a detailed, factual analysis of the operation of the statute and in a critical
analysis of the justification argued by the state. The King court, for example,
justifies the impact of its open-ended grandparent visitation statute on the defendant
family by simply noting that it is an "appropriate response to the change in the
demographics of domestic relations,"' including divorce and illegitimacy, and by
announcing that a "grandchild will ordinarily benefit from contact with the
grandparent."'" It explores the state's argument no further than this, either in
theory or in practice. The Cleburne Court, on the other hand, notes that although
the state raised general safety concerns because of the proposed group home's
proximity to ajunicr high school, closer examination shows that those concerns are
merely "vague, undifferentiated fears. " m The Cleburne Court comments further
that thirty mentally retarded students already attended the junior high school and
that this evidence of the actual relationship between the parties, rather than some
general presumption, must control.22
Had the King court applied this "traditional" conception of rational basis review
to the open-ended grandparent visitation statute before it, its conclusions would
obviously have been quite different. Even if the King court's asserted interest in
preservation of family structure T4 could appropriatily apply to grandparents
asserting visitation rights to children living with their married natural parents,
the grandparent visitation statute before the court bore "no fair or substantial
relation" to that objective. Like the grounds unsuccessfully asserted in Cleburne,
the King majority's validation of the statute as necessary to strengthen familial
bonds is an unsubstantiated generality actually at odds not only with the specific
circumstances before the court but with many future circumstances as well. Under
the traditional conceptualization of rational basis review approved in Cleburne, a
statute cannot be said to rationally address the breakdown of family life where, by
its express terms, ip can act indiscriminately upon all families, whether they have
suffered any "breakdown" or not.
The King majority's other assertion that the statute is rational and therefore
constitutional because grandparent visitation "will ordinarily benefit" a
grandchild 7 suffers a similar fate when traditional rational basis review is applied
219. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
220. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992).
221. Id.
222. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
223. Id.
224. King, 828 S.V1.2d at 632.
225. See infra notes 298-307 and accompanying text regarding legitimate exercises of the
government's legislative power.
226. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 416 (1920).




in this manner. Coercive state interference in family life has been condemned as
harmful to children, no matter how laudable its goal.' Whatever philosophical
differences individual professionals may espouse,' all disciplines agree that
children require the stability of a continuous relationship with fit parents.m
Indeed, "[tihe child's need for... stability is so great that disruptions of the child-
parent relationship by the state, even when there appears to be inadequate parental
care, frequently do more harm than good."'" When, as in King, the quality of a
228. See, e.g., Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[Dlelay [in returning the child
erroneously removed from his parents to their custody] implicates the child's interests in his family's
integrity and in the nurture and companionship of his parents."). In a marginal aside, the Jordan court
rather tartly observes that "the Commonwealth should not blithely presume in a context as grave as this
one where children have been taken from their families by the state that it is free not to seek review [of
the removal] before the Monday or next business day following a Friday or weekend removal." Id. at
344 n.12; see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing a family's right
"to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state" as the most
fundamental component of familial privacy). Indeed, grandparent visitation statutes may be particularly
irrational in light of the harm caused by judicial intervention itself. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d
769, 773 (Ga.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995).
229. Three cursory examples of points on the continuum of thought regarding the best interests of
the child help illustrate the range of positions taken. For Joseph Goldstein, the child's best interests are
primarily served by nonintervention, except in clear-cut, truly egregious circumstances of "serious bodily
injury" or where parents may actually have attempted to do them injury. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 72 (1979). Standards promulgated under the aegis of the
American Bar Association, but never adopted, generally require a less definitive demonstration of injury
or threat of injury to the child, but nevertheless advocate caution in initiating any state intervention. With
regard to cultural differences, for example, these standards note that "failure to recognize that children
can develop adequately in a range of environments and with different types of parenting may lead to
intervention that disturbs a healthful situation for the child." INSTrruTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
& THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING
TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 1.4 cmt., at 44 (1977). Farther along the continuum, Professor Garrison
advocates inclusive statutory definitions of abuse and neglect, on a theory that achieving an environment
which is both stable and nurturing is sufficiently important to justify more proactive state intervention.
"[S]eparation from a disturbed home, which produces an improvement in the child's care, is often
preferable to a child's remaining in the disturbed environment." Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare
Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1780 (1987). These
commentators thus advocate stability; differences arise as to how and where the stability is best achieved.
230. See infra notes 365-72 and accompanying text.
231. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy -
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 474 (1983); see also ANN M.
HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES 187 (1983) (Family Law Series) ("Courts increasingly
are recognizing the inherent value in keeping children with their parents even though the parents may
provide only marginal parenting."). The author subsequently adds the following practical advice: "The
attorney for the parent... should emphasize the disruption to the child of any removal from home and
placement with strangers is worse than the speculative danger to the child pending a hearing on the
merits of the case." Id. at 177; see also Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected
Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in
Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 639 (1976) ("Because children
are strongly attached to their parents, even "bad" parents, intervention that disrupts the parent-child
relationship can be extremely damaging to the child."); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care - In Whose
Best Interests?, 43 HARv. ED. REv. 599 (1973).
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child's family life has not been called into question at all, coerced grandparent
visitation acquires what can only be described as an entirely irrational cast.
In contrast to grandparent visitation decisions which apply rational basis review
under a hybrid theory that the intrusion on family life is minimal and the virtues of
visitation many,232 Herndon v. Tuhey?3 arrives at its application of a rational
basis standard by a different, and even more circuitous, routeY4 To address the
constitutionality of its open-ended grandparent visitation statute as applied to an
intact family unit, lerndon first acknowledges the line of United States Supreme
Court cases articulating a familial right to privacy. 5 The court describes this
constitutional right as "not absolute,"' however, and as a right which can be
limited provided that "the magnitude of the infringement by the state"nl is below
a certain level. To support this curiously grudging conceptualization of the
constitutional protection to be afforded to a fundamental right, the Herndon Court
quotes United States Supreme Court dicta in Zablocki v. Redhaifl8 concerning
limitation on the fundamental right to marry:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way
to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relation-
ship may legitimately be imposedY9
The Herndon court's attempt to thus legitimize its theory that an award of
grandparent visitation is a constitutionally acceptable intrusion on family life is
doomed, however, for the court's use of Zablocki misconstrues the distinction
between types of regulation which is central to the Zablocki analysis.
In Zablocki, Appellee Redhail successfully challenged a state statute which
prevented the noncustodial parents of minor children from marrying unless they
could demonstrate not only that all support obligations had been met but also that
the children covered by support orders "[were] not then and [were] not likely
thereafter to become public charges."' Appellee Redhail had fathered a child and
had admitted paternity. As a result, he had been subject to an order to pay child
support," largely unsatisfied,u2 since the child's infancy. The parties stipulated,
232. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 632; Sanchez v. Parker, 1995 WL 489146, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct.
June 20, 1995).
233. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
234. The path which Herndon followed is of particular significance since it was followed by many
subsequent decisions.
235. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 208.
238. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
239. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978)).
240. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.





further, that the child would have been a public charge even if appellee had been
current in his child- support payments throughout the six years which had elapsed
since the child's birth. 3 Appellee Redhail subsequently wished to marry, and, as
he pointed out to the court, the challenged statute prevented him from doing so
either in his home state or in any other.' In light of the fundamental status of the
right to marry, 5 it is hardly surprising that the Court invalidated the statute as a
virtually complete prohibition of marriage as applied to individuals such as
Appellee.' Indeed, for present purposes, the significance of the Court's decision
lies not in its rejection of statutory interference with certain marriages but in the
precise nature of that interference as contrasted with the interference the Court
addressed in the companion case of Califano v. Jobst,47 decided the same term.
Unlike the statute challenged in Zablocki, the Court noted that the legislation at
issue in Jobst placed no "direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get
married."'' In Jobst, Petitioner Jobst unsuccessfully challenged provisions of the
Social Security Act which specified that certain benefits he received as a result of
his dependent disabled child classification249 were automatically terminated since
he had married a woman not entitled to benefits under the Act, even though his new
wife was also permanently disabled tm Comparing Jobst's circumstances with those
at issue in Zablocki, the Zablocki Court noted that Jobst was able to marry despite
the challenged provision;"' although he lost $20 per month in benefits, 2 no
aspect of the protected activity of deciding to marry and establish a family was
directly affected at ally 3 The distinction made in Zablocki is thus not as the
Herndon court represented it. It is not a distinction between legislation having a
greater or lesser impact on a fundamental right but rather a distinction between
legislation which affects a constitutionally protected right directly as opposed to
legislation which does not. Since a fit parent's right to make child-rearing decisions
is both the constitutionally protected activity itself and the protected activity upon
which a grandparent visitation award directly intrudes, grandparent visitation statutes
243. Id. Argument was held before the United States Supreme Court on October 4, 1977.
244. ka at 375.
245. Id. at 383 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
246. Ld. at 387. Although appellant had argued that the statute was violative of his rights under both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 376-77, the majority
invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds, id. at 391.
247. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
248. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12.
249. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 48.
250. Id.
251. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12.
252. Jobst, 343 U.S. at 57 n.17.
253. In finding the regulation constitutionally permissible, the Court noted that Petitioner Jobst had,
in fact, married during the pendency of the appeal. This conclusion can also be expressed as the Court's
recognition that although the state may discourage the exercise of fundamental rights by reducing
government benefits "where a state enacts regulations that affirmatively limit the exercise of a
fundamental right, the state must prove that its act serves a compelling end." Valerie J. Pacer, Note,
Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard - Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard and
Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WAsH. U. L.Q. 295, 302 (1995).
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are conceptually identical to the legislation which Zablocki found impermissible.
Indeed, Zablocki actually contradicts the argument for which the Herndon court has
cited it.2-
The next step in the Herndon court's attempt to legitimize its application of
rational basis review to a grandparent visitation statute is to make the inapposite
argument that because Zablocki permits "some" regulation of family life, rational
basis is appropriated under the undue burden test."5 As articulated by Justice
O'Connor, writing for the dissent in City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 6 the undue burden test represents an attempt to accommodate a conflict
between two different interests, both of undisputed constitutional validity.' In the
First Amendment context, for example, it has been applied to reconcile the conflict
between an individual's rights of free speech and association and the government's
right and obligation to conduct legislative investigations."8 Thus, although the
government's power of inquiry is as great as its power to legislate,"9 its inquiries
were impermissible where they destroyed the privacy essential to a group espousing
dissident beliefs."1 In that context, the Court found that it "infringe[d] substantial-
ly" on associational rights. 1 In the context of the abortion regulations in Akron,
Justice O'Connor framed the conflict as one between a woman's "personal right" to
decide whether to have an abortion and the state's "important interests" in medical
254. The Herndon court compounds this error by suggesting that the Zablocki Court's distinction
between direct and indirect statutory infringement bears some logical relationship to the undue burden
test. Some state courts c.valuating grandparent visitation statutes have followed Herndon's reasoning,
adopted its use of Zablotki and thereby repeated this error. See, e.g., Pollard v. Pollard, 1995 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2509, at *8. In light of the fact that the undue burden test is applicable, if at all, to the
quite different situation in which legislation furthers one constitutionally protected interest by burdening
another, see infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text, it is hardly surprising that no United States
Supreme Court or federal court decision has ever recognized any relationship between Zablocki's
reasoning and the undue burden test.
255. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208. Subsequent grandparent visitation cases have cited Herndon for
this idea, in what can only be described as a "knee jerk" fashion, with no attempt to independently
analyze the postulated relationship between 7ablocki and the undue burden test. See, e.g., Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 n.18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Apart from Herndon's own progeny, however,
the Herndon court appears to be the only court to attempt to wed Zablocki to an undue burden analysis.
In Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Utah 1984), decided six years after Zablocki and a year
after City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), a police officer
challenged his termination from the force, made on the grounds that he engaged in plural marriage in
violation of state law. Although the Potter court not only cited Zablocki but also discussed the state's
interest in requiring compliance with its criminal laws, it made no reference to the undue burden test and,
indeed, used the words "undue burden" in their lay sense. Potter, 585 F. Supp. at 1139.
256. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
257. Id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 462-63 (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)).
259. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545 (1963) (citing Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)).
260. Id. at 558.




standards and procedures, coupled with the state's interests in protecting human
life.m
The abortion regulations at issue in Akron, for example, endeavored to further
both aspects of the state's interests in several ways. They provided that all
abortions performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital, that a
doctor obtain parental or judicial consent for any abortion to be performed on an
unmarried minor, and that the attending physician provide certain specified
information concerning fetal development, the risks of the procedure, and possible
psychological sequellae.2 The Akron majority applied a strict scrutiny standard
to find all of these provisions unconstitutional, either because they "unreasonably
infringe[d]" on a woman's access to abortion2 " or because they intruded upon
her right to make the abortion decision free of governmental intrusion by limiting
the discretion of her physician' or healthcare provider.' " Justice O'Connor,
on the other hand, writing for the dissent, argued that under an undue burden
standard, rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny was appropriate. Justice
O'Connor noted that the right to an abortion "cannot be said to be absolute."267
It is, instead, a "limited" fundamental right2" qualified by the state's ongoing
interest in potential life.' Given the competing rights at issue in the abortion
context, therefore, the appropriate inquiry was not whether some infringement of
a woman's right to an abortion occurred, for the state's compelling interests permit
it to permissibly inhibit abortions to some degree 7  Instead, Justice O'Connor
stated that only when the challenged regulation of abortion represented an
"absolute obstacle" could the law be said to represent an undue burden.2 '
Absent an undue burden, an appropriate balancing of competing interests
mandated rational basis review. The undue burden test, in short, is designed to
evaluate legislation that has the effect of pitting two rights or interests of
constitutional magnitude against each other.
As a threshold matter, then, the logical flaw in using the undue burden test to
analyze the intrusion occasioned by grandparent visitation statutes is evident
simply in the nature of the test itself. Since the only constitutionally significant
interest implicated is the right of parents and children to familial autonomy, no
logical basis exists for its use. Indeed, in a very real sense the substantial burden
test literally cannot be used to analyze a grandparent visitation statute at all. With
262. Akron, 462 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 422-24 nn.3-5. The challenged regulations also provided that fetal remains were to be
disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner," a prim and curiously vague provision which appeared
to leave justices on both sides of the holding somewhat nonplused. Id. at 451.
264. Id. at 439.
265. Id. at 445. -
266. Id. at 447-48.
267. Id. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973)).
268. Id. at 465 n.10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
270. Id at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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only one interest at stake, no assessment of how challenged legislation either
furthers or inhibits the competing rights and interests can occur.2' The Herndon
court identifies a constitutional right to familial autonomy,2" for example, and
the appellant parents argue that the grandparent visitation statute in question un-
constitutionally inhibits the exercise of that right.274 Since the grandparent
visitation statute does not further a constitutionally valid competing interest,
however, the next step of the undue burden test cannot be taken. Instead, the
Herndon court notes that state regulation of the family "is proper and not
unconstitutional"'27 in many circumstances, and its analysis slips into the general
deference to legislative judgment 76 which Justice O'Connor specifically rejected
in this context.2"
The Herndon court attempts to circumvent the practical difficulties of applying
the undue burden test in the absence of a conflicting, constitutionally significant
interest in two ways. Its first tactic is to simply adopt Justice O'Connor's "extent
of the infringement" language regardless of the absence of a comparable
context.27 It establishes a comparison between the intrusion occasioned by an
award of grandparent visitation and the intrusion occasioned by other regulations
touching on family life.2' Since this comparison does not involve competing
rights, the Herndon court cannot actually implement the balancing process
involved in Justice O'Connor's analysis by weighing the validity of the competing
interests and assessing the impact of the constitutional interest underlying the
regulation with the constitutional right upon which it touches. It, therefore, makes
a general comparison between intrusions the United States Supreme Court has
condemned and the effect of its grandparent visitation statute on the family,
concluding that court-ordered grandparent visitation is appropriate based on this
"casual comparison" alone.2"
272. In Akron, for example, Justice O'Connor makes it clear that the right to an abortion "can be
understood only by con:sidering both the woman's interest and the nature of the state's interference"
because "the State possesses compelling interests in the protection of potential human life and in maternal
health throughout pregnancy." Id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
273. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 209-10.
277. Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
278. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208. The court refers to "[t]he importance of the extent of the
infringement in a fundanental rights analysis," although the undue burden test has never been generally
applied in cases involving most fundamental rights. Id.
279. Id. at 209.
280. "[A] casual comparison of the visitation rights contemplated for grandparents ... with the
magnitude of the infringement in [the U.S. Supreme Court cases] demonstrates that no constitutional
violation is present ...." Id. Perhaps wisely, the Herndon court does not suggest any means of
quantifying the relative intrusions, for its is by no means clear that such a comparison would support the
conclusion it wishes to draw. A state ban on teaching certain foreign languages during school hours
(which the U.S. Supreme Court held to unconstitutionally infringe on child-rearing autonomy in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 3S0, 403 (1923)), for example, could impose a far more minimal intrusion on the




The second way in which the Herndon court attempts to justify its use of the
undue burden test is by following the King majority and locating the missing
competing interest in a combination of interests and factors of varying logical and
constitutional legitimacy all added together. To accomplish this process of
discerning a whole that is greater than its parts, the Herndon majority first
borrows the language of parental rights cases and uses it out of context to
describe grandparents' "important role in the raising of their grandchildren."'"
The Herndon court cites no authority for this grandparents' "right" beyond the
King majority's own words; as the King dissent acidly notes with regard to this
"right," no authority is cited because none exists.2" Second, the Herndon
majority approvingly notes the King majority's assertion that the state has an
interest in "strengthen[ing] familial bonds."' The fatal flaw in this assertion is,
of course, that the constitutional concept of "family" does not include
"grandparent" at all. Leaving aside this obvious difficulty, however, the Herndon
court's assertion fails on other logical and analytical grounds. Even assuming,
simply for sake of argument, that the court means "promoting generational
contact"'  rather than "strengthening familial bonds" and that it has thereby
described a legitimate state goal, 8' a grandparent visitation statute is neither a
parents and children who would otherwise be together. Furthermore, its ban could be completely
circumvented by providing language instruction at other times. Instead, the Herndon court simply asserts
that "even a casual comparison" of grandparent visitation and the infringements invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court suggests that the statute at issue is constitutional, Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209, leaving
unstated the fact that an exacting comparison might yield a different conclusion and that the balancing
analysis of Justice O'Connor's undue burden test literally cannot be applied at all.
281. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209.
282. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
283. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209 (quoting King, 828 S.W.2d at 632).
284. The court does, in fact, use this phrase at a later point in its description of the interest it is
advancing. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210 (quoting King, 828 S.W.2d at 632). In what is perhaps a
further attempt to spin familial or generational considerations into the competing state interest it lacks,
Herndon later quotes King approvingly for the proposition that grandparent visitation statutes are justified
as a means of furthering "loving relationship[s] between family members." Id. at 209-10 (quoting King,
828 S.W.2d at 632). This assertion fails~as an impermissible excursion into paternalism, if not into pure
fantasy. The state has no legitimate interest in the tenor of relationships within a functional family unit
or in "making things better" by imposing a state approved model of family life.
285. An exercise of the government's legislative power will generally be considered legitimate if
it relates to the health, safety, morals or welfare of its citizens. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that land use regulations satisfy substantive due process
unless they have "no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare"). This
definition obviously provides the legislature with considerable latitude. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (upholding a ban on consensual homosexual sodomy as a rational method
of furthering legitimate interests in conventional morality). However, it clearly stops short of sanctioning
legislation with the clearly political purpose of harming or benefiting groups that are simply socially
disfavored or particularly influential. See, e.g., USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (invalidating,
in part, ban on giving "household" food stamps to groups of unrelated people because its purpose of
harming "hippies" was not legitimate).
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narrowly tailored means of furthering that goal' nor, indeed, even rationally
related to it.' As the King dissent notes, it may sometimes be true that
grandparents can share a close relationship with grandchildren, in other cases it
is not.' There is, furthermore, little evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that
creating a new means for grandparents to sue their children is a significant source
of bonhomie."' Finally, there is ample evidence from all disciplines that judicial
intrusion in the family unit is an inevitable source of trauma for the child" and
may affect the parents' marriage as well.29' In short, grandparents have no
legally cognizable interest in their grandchildren's upbringing, and grandparent
visitation statutes do not further any other legitimate state goal. Viewed either
individually or in sum, the considerations the Herndon court advances as the
"competing interes3ts" to support its undue burden test are simply unequal to the
task.
286. Statutes purporting to regulate the exercise of a fundamental right require "strict scrutiny."
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The statutes must be analyzed in light of any "less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The
state should then prevail "only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bates v. City
of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). This standard is articulated in the specific context of
grandparent visitation by Justice Lambert in his dissent to King. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert,
J., dissenting) ("[Since] parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining an autonomous family
unit... court-ordered visitation with a minor child by one outside the nuclear family amounts to an
invasion of family autonomy. The question thus becomes what is the compelling state interest in
requiring visitation ... ").
287. If, as courts upholding awards of grandparent visitation assert, rational basis review were
appropriate, the standa-d could be described in these terms.
288. King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
289. Indeed, a statute permitting grandparents to sue for visitation may simply serve to arm the
grandparents with the coercive power of the state. Although many grandparent visitation suits may be
grounded in an unselfish interest in grandchildren, a disturbing number of cases and commentators refer
to grandparent visitaticn suits as veiled attempts to control or punish the grandparent's adult child, and
note their deleterious effect on the parent-grandparent relationship as well as on the child. See, e.g., King,
828 S.W.2d at 633 (Lambert, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe evidence is clear that [the grandfather] is an
overbearing individual who intruded with impunity upon [his son and daughter-in-law's] family life,
demonstrating total indifference to their wishes"); Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Nev. 1995)
(describing evidence of the grandmother's general attempts to control family members, and specifically,
her attempt to control her son through a grandparent visitation suit); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,
576 n.l (Tenn. 1993) ('[I]t has been suggested that forced visitation in a family experiencing animosity
between a child's parents and grandparents increases the potential for animosity ...."); Elizabeth M.
Belsom, Note, Grandparent Visitation: A Florida Focus, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 179, 183 (1989) ("Because
of the relatively comfortable lifestyle of Florida grandparents, courts should be wary of situations in
which grandparents w-nt to control their children's lives."); Elin McCoy, Grandparents Seek Rights to
Visit With Grandchild, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 4, 1984, at CI (quoting Dr. Justin D. Call, Chief of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry at the University of California Irvine Medical Center) ("[The grandmother in
question] wasn't realy interested in her grandchild; she only wanted control over [her son].").
290. See supra nctes 228-31 and accompanying text.
291. Sharon Furr Ladd, Note, Tennessee Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents and the Best
Interest of the Child, Y5 MaM. ST. U. L. REv. 635, 652 (1985) ("If the natural parents have a viable
marriage, it is not wise to allow parents of either parent to bring suit, as this could have a devastating




The fundamental nature of the single right at stake in grandparent visitation
cases makes the rational basis review applied by courts upholding grandparent
visitation statutes improper. The right to family integrity insulates fit parents
living with their children from state control of their family life. A grandparent
visitation suit, by definition, directly infringes on parents' child-rearing choices
and responsibilities. It cannot be justified, therefore, as an ancillary or incidental
intrusion. Similarly, since grandparent visitation implicates no competing
constitutionally significant interest, an undue burden test is logically inapplicable.
Even if such a test were, for argument's sake, applied, it would be difficult to
argue that forcing parents to deliver their minor child to the custody of a third
party whether for a day or an hour is not a "significant intrusion" indeed.2'
Since family rights are relational and family autonomy protects this indivisible
whole, grandparent visitation statutes cannot be justified as legislation having a
rational basis.
In contrast to the often awkward process293 of fashioning some sort of a
distinction between forced grandparent visitation and other intrusions on family
life in order to justify rational basis review, for courts invalidating grandparent
visitation statutes, the conclusion that strict scrutiny is necessary follows directly
from their conceptualization of the family integrity right. Since these courts
recognize the right as a broad, comprehensive right, essentially relational in
nature, they correctly consider the intrusion resulting from forced visitation to be
a constitutional significant infringement of a protected right. The Hawk court
observes, for example, that the constitutionally protected relationship between
parents and child includes "all of the consequences that naturally follow from
[that] relationship."'2 Similarly, the dissents in Herndon and the concurrence
in Beagle v. Beagle295 find it unnecessary to consider the specific conditions or
duration of a grandparent visitation award; the simple fact that the government
can force a third party on an unwilling family is a significant intrusion in and of
itself.296 Under this conceptualization of the family integrity right, all
governmental intrusions are constitutionally significant, all must be evaluated
292. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting).
293. For a striking example of sheer awkwardness, one need only look at the Herndon majority's
attempt to extrapolate a nonconstitutionally based limitation on grandparent visitation awards from the
fact that the statute at issue specified that visitation be "unreasonably denied" for ninety days prior to
suit. See supra note 205.
294. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1993).
295. 654 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
296. See id. at 1265 (Webster, J., concurring); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J.,
dissenting). Although the Beagle majority rejected a constitutional challenge to Florida's open-ended
grandparent visitation statute, it certified the question of the statute's constitutionality to the Florida
Supreme Court. Beagle, 654 So. 2d at 1263. In a separate opinion, Justice Webster disputed the
conclusion that the statute was constitutional under either the Florida Constitution or the United States
Constitution. Id. at 1263 (Webster, J., concurring). Since Justice Webster agreed that the constitutional
issue should be resolved by the Florida Supreme Court, he technically concurred with the majority, and
his opinion must therefore be described as a concurrence. In function, however, it is really an
exceptionally eloquent and detailed dissent.
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under a strict scrutiny standard. When strict scrutiny is applied to grandparent
visitation statutes which override the child-rearing decisions of fit, married
parents, the grandparent visitation statute fails.
III. Sources of State Power
Since the family's constitutionally protected interest lies in its private relation-
ships and in the child-rearing decisions parents make, the only circumstance in
which the state has a compelling interest in forced intervention, and therefore a
legitimate source of power to intrude, would be when the child is threatened with
"substantial harm." The state, acting through its police power, can act to protect
its individual citizens from injuries inflicted by third parties or to protect its
citizenry as a whole from threats to its health and safety. Since police power is
the power to preserve social order, its proper use is consonant with "the general
purposes for which the state was created."2" Thus, in the context of family life,
the state's police power provides authority to require the vaccination of children
against communicable diseases even over the objections of their fit parents.29
Similarly, the state's police power allows it to override a decision of otherwise fit
parents where the decision could severely harm the child, under a theory that the
survival of its children is essential to society as a whole. In Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts,'" for example, the Court refused to invalidate legislation which
prohibited a parent9" from permitting a minor to sell merchandise on a public
street."1 Although the Court acknowledged the parent's constitutionally protected
right to child-rearing autonomy, it found a narrow exception necessary in light of
the "crippling effects"3" of child employment, "more especially in public
places." 3" Police power thus empowered the state to intrude on a parental
decision in the interests of society as a whole where the decision directly and
severely imperiled the child.
The state's other source of authority to intrude on family life, its parens patriae
power, is also activated only by a severe threat of harm to the child, but as parens
patriae the state acts from the viewpoint and in the interests of the child. In the
American constitutional system, the state's power to act as parens patriae is
generally derived from the King's right and obligation under English law to act
297. Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1200 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)).
298. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905), the Court affirmed a state's authority,
acting pursuant to its police power, to require vaccination of adults and children regardless of their
wishes and exempting children only when "certified by a registered physician to be unfit subjects for
vaccination."
299. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
300. The "parent" in Prince was actually the child's "aunt and guardian." Id. at 159. The Court
consistently treats her as a parent, however, referring to her conduct, for example, as "motherlike." Id.
at 162.
301. Il at 160.





as "guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves."3" The
King, acting through his chancellors, thus assumed responsibility for those among
his subjects "legally unable ... to take care of themselves and their property."3 5
Although the original exercises of parens patriae authority corresponded to
allegiance paid to the King, by the 17th century the scope of the parens patriae
interest had expanded. From that general period on, orders were issued providing
for the education or support of minors apparently simply because cases of
demonstrated need were brought to the chancellor's attention rather than because
of any direct financial interest of the Crown."
Thus, parens patriae power and police power both provide the state with
authority to act to protect children lacking the guidance and protection of fit
parents of their own, and although they may represent different perspectives, both
contemplate harm to the child and, in practical terms, have been used nearly
interchangeably in the fashioning of a threshold requirement of parental unfitness,
harm, or threatened harm. Since society vests child-rearing responsibility in
parents, 7 parents are the children's protection from the forces and pressures of
society around them. In Bellotti v. Baird,3 0 for example, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a state statute which required, inter alia, that a minor seeking
an abortion get the consent of both her parents." Although the Court concluded
that a minor's emerging constitutional rights prevented a state from "impos[ing]
a blanket provision.., requiring the consent of a parent," it expressly affirmed
the significance of the parental role."' "The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent or involvement." ''
304. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
305. JOSEPH CHIrrY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PEROGATIVES OF THE CROWN; AND THE
RELATIVE DUIEs AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 155 (1820). Compare 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46,
at *47 ("[The sovereign] is the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics .... ").
306. Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.
L. REV. 147, 149 (1970).
307. The classic articulation of this precept is probably still Justice McReynolds' rejection of Plato's
suggestions for state-directed child-rearing in favor of the American constitutional conception of an
autonomous parent-child relationship. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (citing Plato's
Ideal Commonwealth).
308. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
309. Id. at 626.
310. Id. at 643. The Court thus implicitly recognizes that "family" is a relational concept rather than
a static one, and that the family integrity right may not apply to it in the same way as its members
mature. Indeed, the Court has suggested that when a child is mature enough to become pregnant a family
autonomy analysis of her relationship to her parents is not longer sufficient. Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority."). Nor is one transformed from child
to adult or parent in a magic flash. The process of becoming independent of one's family and the
corresponding change in the contours of the family integrity right occurs in tandem with other facets of
maturation. Ultimately the "child" is an independent adult, capable of forming and being part of a
different and separate family.
311. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637.
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Similarly, in In re Gault,"' the Court stressed that where state action impacts
a child, parental involvement is an indispensable component of the due process
to which a child is entitled.3 ' Gault involved prosecution of a minor, Gerald
Gault, for making "lewd" phone calls.1 4 Gerald was initially detained without
any attempt to notify his parents,"5 and his subsequent prosecution was notably
lacking in procedural formality. Although Gault is a landmark statement of the
proposition that "benevolently motivated" judicial discretion in the juvenile
context cannot substitute for procedural formality, it is also significant for its
express recognition of the family integrity right in the context of the parent's role
as protectors of the child. The Court held that Gerald Gault and his parents were
both entitled to procedural protection, not simply because of the minor's
constitutional rights but because the presence of a minor's parents, in and of itself,
is a necessary part of protecting the minor's rights."6 A determination of
parental unfitness thus necessarily describes a "substantial" harm, whether a court
uses that word or not, and, conversely, an allegation of "harm" will not rise to a
sufficiently "substantial" level to serve as a compelling state interest absent a
finding of parental unfitness. Courts invalidating open-ended grandparent
visitation statutes by imposing a requirement of harm as a jurisdictional
prerequisite to th, grandparent's suit are thus simply recognizing the well-
established constitutional significance of the parent-child relationship. The
threshold finding of harm these cases require is the same threshold approved in
all other cases involving family rights. Indeed, by establishing a bifurcated
proceeding in which a determination of parental unfitness must precede any
argument over the best interests of the child, this group of grandparent visitation
cases actually legitimize the concept of grandparent visitation itself, shifting its
basis from sentiment and speculation to the constitutional principles of parental
authority and family autonomy essential to a free society.
Courts which invalidate grandparent visitation awards made against the united
wishes of the child's parents consistently conceptualize the required threshold
threat in this manner, finding no legitimate source of authority to intrude on
family life absent a parental unfitness, harm to the child, or the threat of harm to
the child. Discussing the role of state intervention in the family under the law of
its state, for example, the Brooks court notes that the same threshold requirement
of threatened harm to the child permeates its case, statutory, and constitutional
law." 7 A Georgia trial court may issue orders promoting a child's welfare
pursuant to statutory law, for instance, only if the child is living "under
312. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
313. Id. at 53-54, 56.
314. U at4,6.
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id. at 41, 56; see also id. at 53 (citing with approval a state court decision concluding that two
minors' confessions were involuntary where, inter alia, the children's parents were not allowed to be with
them while they were teing questioned).




circumstances of destitution and suffering, abandonment . ... "s The plain
import of both federal and state law, the court reasons, is thus that prevention of
harm cannot be equated to promoting health and welfare. Furthermore, the court
concludes, this principle would require invalidation of any319 grandparent
visitation provision not specifying some threshold finding of harm to the child,
even if grandparent visitation could be assumed to be of universal benefit to the
targeted child."
All other courts invalidating awards of grandparent visitation have also done
so because the threshold precondition to the state's power to act was not met
through allegations of harm to the child; by so holding they have made the same
distinction between harm to the child and the simple absence of a purported
perceived benefit. In Lingo v. Kelsay,32 for example, the court rejected the
grandparents' position that the parent's conduct in denying them contact with their
grandchildren constituted the statutory criterion of "extraordinary circumstances"
necessary to justify an award of visitation.3" The court noted that there were no
allegations of neglect or inadequate parental care and then found an award of
visitation inconsistent with both the overall statutory scheme and with the parental
right to custody.3" Similarly, in his dissenting opinion to King, Justice Lambert
noted that even if children's lives were invariably enriched by intergenerational
contact, "mere improvement in quality of life" provides no justification for state
intervention where the child's circumstances are otherwise satisfactory.u As
Justice Lambert notes, to suggest otherwise is the logical equivalent of asserting
that the state has the power to redistribute its infant population to provide each
child with the "best family."3"
By identifying the compelling state interest necessary to override a family's
integrity right as parental unfitness, with its corresponding harm to the child,
courts applying strict scrutiny to invalidate grandparent visitation statutes divorce
grandparent visitation law from any illegitimate roots in sentiment and make it
consistent with the vast body of law articulating the relationship of the family to
the state."l Although these courts describe that interest in a variety of ways, it
318. Il
319. The Brooks decision goes a step further in this regard than any previous decision that
invalidated an award of grandparent visitation on constitutional grounds. Brooks invalidates any award
of grandparent visitation made over the objection of a fit parent, rather than distinguishing between an
award of visitation made where the child lives in an intact family and an award made where the child's
family has already suffered the disruption of death or divorce. See id.
320. Both the Brooks majority and concurrence take issue with this supposition from several
perspectives. See id. at 775 (Sears, J., concurring).
321. 651 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
322. Id. at 500.
323. Id.
324. King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
325. l (Lambert, J., dissenting).
326. Justice Webster's concurrence in Beagle, disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that
Florida's open-ended grandparent visitation statute is constitutional, focuses on exactly this issue. He
notes the extensive Florida precedent affirming the "longstanding and fundamental liberty interest of
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is clear that they are really identifying the same single clear threshold. The Hawk
court, for example, describes this threshold as an interest in preventing the "harm"
that occurs when "the child's welfare [is] threatened."3  The court elaborates by
linking a finding of significant harm to a finding of "parental unfitness."3"
Similarly, in Brooks the court notes that the United States Supreme Court has
held that state interference in the family is justifiable only where parental
decisions "would result in harm to the child."3 The threshold finding of harm
these courts establish33 is thus the same threshold of parental unfitness
described by Santosky v. Kramer3' as the indispensable precondition to
governmental intrusion in the family. Phrases referring to the child's "harm" '332
or "neglect" '333 thus reference the child's perspective; phrases referring to parental
"inadequacy" 33 or "unfitness' '33' reference the parent's perspective. All of these
phrases describe the single circumstance in which the "family" as recognized by
our constitutional jurisprudence no longer exists, 3' and the state is permitted,
and indeed obligated, as parens patriae, to intervene.
Clearly, either the state's police power or its parens patriae responsibilities
would obligate it to care for a child who has been orphaned or abandoned.
Similarly, state intervention is clearly appropriate and necessary where the child
parents in determining the care and upbringing of their children free from the heavy hand of government
paternalism." Beagle, 654 So. 2d at 1265 (Webster, J., concurring) (quoting Padgett v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991)). Relating this concept of court-ordered
grandparent visitation, Ee then comments that Florida's open-ended grandparent visitation statute intrudes
"into one of the most delicate areas of parental decision-making - with whom their child shall form and
maintain relationships" and "sends the clear message that the state knows better with whom a child
should associate than do the child's parents." Id. at 1265 (Webster, J., concurring).
327. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580.
328. Id. at 581.
329. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 772 (citations omitted).
330. The dissenting justices in King and Herndon, and the concurring justice in Beagle all advocate
this same threshold. See Beagle, 654 So. 2d at 1265 (Webster, J., concurring); King, 828 S.W.2d at 635
(Lambert, J., dissenting); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Covington, J., dissenting).
331. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
332. See Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 772; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580-81.
333. See Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 772 (interference with "health or welfare" of child); Lingo, 651 So.
2d at 500; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580.
334. See Lingo. 651 So. 2d at 500.
335. See Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 774 (Sears, J., concurring) (fit parents must have exclusive right to
determine what is in child's best interest); Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581.
336. This threshold is also applicable to circumstances in which harm to the child is threatened, but
has not yet occurred. The state, as parens patriae, need not sit idly by if it can demonstrate the
probability of impending harm by clear and convincing proof. Indeed, provisions providing for
intervention in a family based upon findings of a danger of harm to the child are included in some form
in the child welfare law:; of all jurisdictions. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8a-2(6) (Michie 1992).
Thus, if "harm to the child" and "parental unfitness" reference the same threshold viewed from two
different perspectives, the term "substantial danger of harm," Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 579 (emphasis
added), can be understood as referencing that threshold from a different temporal point. Courts
invalidating grandparent visitation statutes are thus logically consistent in this respect as well with the




is abused or neglected and a "family" in the constitutional sense no longer exists.
The state may also override parental decisions, however, where a child has
parents whose fitness is unquestioned, but the child is nevertheless subject to
some discrete or temporary threat of harm which the parents are unable or
unwilling to avert. It is this last aspect of parens patriae authority which is
typically invoked either expressly337 or by implication338 when grandparents
seek court-ordered visitation, for it avoids the practical and ethical difficulties of
alleging unfitness339 and corresponds to the occasional temporary nature of the
visitation sought.
The fact that parens patriae power may apply to some circumstances when a
child is living in the uninterrupted custody of fit parents is ultimately of no
genuine significance in the context of a grandparent visitation suit, however, since
it neither eliminates a threshold requirement of harm to the child nor provides any
means of circumventing constitutional principles of parental authority. Indeed, the
operation of parens patriae authority in this limited context serves, instead, to
highlight these controlling principles and further demonstrate the constitutional
primacy of parental authority. In Ginsberg v. New York,' for example, the
United States Supreme Court held that the enactment of a statute prohibiting the
sale of "girlie" magazines" to minors was a proper exercise of the state's parens
patriae authority. Appellant Ginsberg was convicted of selling several such
magazines to a minor. He unsuccessfully appealed on the theory that the
magazines in question would not be obscene for persons seventeen years of age
or older, and an individual's constitutional right to read or see material concerning
sexuality should not depend on his or her age. Rejecting this contention, the
Court found that the legislation in question limited minors access to material
which it had determined would "impair[] [their] ethical and moral develop-
ment."34 The Court noted, further, that the legislation's impact on the minors
was permissible because it did not supplant any parental authority or decision -
making.343 Although minors could not purchase the material in question, nothing
337. See, e.g., Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 579.
338. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 632 (grandparent visitation is necessary to preserve "special
bond").
339. No allegations of parental unfitness are involved in any of the cases on which this analysis is
based; in some instances the court expressly praises the parents' parenting abilities. See, e.g., Hawk, 855
S.W.2d at 577.
340. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
341. The statute in question defined these magazines, inter alia, as having "that quality of...
representation ... of nudity... [which] (i) predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid
interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors." Id. at 633.
342. Id. at 641. The Court expressed some doubt that this conclusion could be supported with any
empirical data. It noted, however, that since obscenity is not protected expression it was required to
conclude only that the legislature was "not irrational" in finding that exposure to the material in question
was harmful to minors, a conclusion it could easily reach. Id.
343. Id. at 639.
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in the statute prohibited their parents from purchasing it for them, and parents
could thus "deal with the morals of their children as they saw fit."' " The
statute, furthermore, was an appropriate supplement to parental authority; it
simply implements society's "transcendent interest" in furthering appropriate child
development in the limited circumstances when parents could not do so. It did
not, therefore, represent an infringement on parental authority.
Similarly, courts have found orders permitting certain discrete aspects of
emergency medical treatment of children, given against the express wishes of
their fit parents, constitutionally permissible because of the magnitude of the
documented threat of harm to the child. In Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County
Hospital Unit No. 1,34' for example, the district court rejected a request by
Plaintiff religious group, its governing agency, and certain individual members for
a declaration of their right to decline blood transfusions for themselves and their
minor children and for a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant hospitals and
doctors from administering blood transfusions to them or their children.3' The
court noted that, insofar as the suit attempted to limit the emergency medical
treatment necessary for the well being of minor children, it challenged the state's
parens patriae authority.47 Although the Court affirmed the primacy of the
parent's right to ch Id-rearing autonomy, it concluded that the court-ordered blood
transfusions of children were not inconsistent with that right.34' The court noted
that child-rearing autonomy was unaffected except as necessary to save the life
of the child.349 Since the state statute at issue declared a child a ward of the
state for purposes of ordering a blood transfusion only when the transfusion was
deemed medically necessary by the attending physician, the court concluded that
it was bound by the rule set forth in Prince v. Massachusetts?5" Neither "rights
of religion nor rights of parenthood"3 '-permits parents to expose children to
communicable disease or consign them "to ill health or death. 35 2 Just as the
state's police power permits it to intrude on familial autonomy to prevent the
344. id.
345. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (one-sentence affirmance).
346. Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 491.
347. Id. at 504.
348. Id.
349. Id. The court cited medical testimony that in each of the ten cases under its review that the
attending physician was of the opinion "that a blood transfusion was or would be vital to save the life
of the patient." Id. at 503 n.10. This analysis of the proper exercise of parens patriae power is not
limited to circumstanca; in which a child will literally die, however. In the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions the risk of serious but non fatal injury occurring in the absence of a blood transfusion is
sufficient to justify the ,.tate's intervention. See Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974). Thus the state acted properly where it ordered a child transfused over the
religious objections of her otherwise fit parents in order to prevent the child from experiencing a series
of strokes which could mean a loss of intellectual function. In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1119 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989).
350. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
351. Id. at 166.




crippling effect of child labor, so the state as parens patriae may act when parents
are unable or unwilling to protect children from impending danger or death.
Subsequent judicial review of orders providing for the medical treatment of
children against the express wishes of their fit parents further highlights the
limited nature of the state's right as parens patriae to intrude on family life and
the seriousness of the threat of harm which must precede any such intrusion. In
Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v. Paddock,353 for example, respondents Mr.
and Mrs. Paddock were expecting a baby by cesarean section and had been
advised that the baby would require immediate medical treatment. In the
judgment of their attending physician, the lives of both mother and baby would
probably be in jeopardy without blood transfusions, to which mother and father
as devout Jehovah's Witnesses refused to consent.3" Noting that the state's
interest in the welfare of its children permitted it to override parental decisions
where the life of a child was threatened, the court ordered any necessary
transfusions to the baby35 and any transfusions at the time of the baby's delivery
as necessary to stabilize Mrs. Paddock's condition.35 The court noted, however,
that in deference to her right to control her own body, Mrs. Paddock was to
receive blood transfusions only as medically necessary at the time of delivery.
Parens patriae authority could not be interpreted to interdict her "freedom to direct
the course of her own treatment" after that point.3" Furthermore, had the parents
been able to choose among reasonable alternative treatments for their baby, the
state would have been powerless "to determine the most 'effective' treatment" and
impose that judgment upon them.358 In short, the state's authority as parens
patriae was limited even within the confines of the life threatening circumstances
before it to the task of alleviating the direct and immediate threat to the child.
Cases invalidating open-ended grandparent visitation statutes recognize not only
that the threat of serious harm to the child is a necessary precondition to any
intrusive power but also that it is a logical corollary of the concept of parental
autonomy as well. The Hawk court stressed the limited nature of parens patriae
power, for example, noting that its reach is limited by constitutional principles
rendering the legislature and courts literally powerless to supplant parents. 9
Indeed, Hawk characterizes a judicial best interests of the child analysis made in
the absence of a threshold finding of harm as "judicial second guessing,""
thereby affirming not only the primacy of familial autonomy but also the reality
that no quantifiable "best interests of the child" really exists for a given child,
apart from the child's continuous relationship with fit parents. Trial justices
applying a "best interests of the child" standard under an open-ended grandparent
353. 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
354. Id. at 444.
355. Id. at 445.
356. Id. at 446.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 445.
359. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581 (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y. 1976)).
360. Id.
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visitation statute are not uncovering scientific truth. Instead, all the trial justice
can really do is decide whose opinion as to the "best interests" of that particular
child most closely corresponds to his own.36 Indeed, as the Brooks court notes,
although there are probably many instances in which a grandparent-grandchild
bond can benefit a child, there is little evidence that this is always, or even most
often, the case36 and ample evidence that the impact of the grandparent
visitation suit on the grandchild can cause great harm.363
This rejection of a best interests of the child standard where no finding of
parental unfitness has been made is actually the most accurate reflection of the
current consensus regarding children's needs. All we really know about a child's
best interests is that a child requires at least minimal care and an uninterrupted
relationship with fit parents." 4 We know that state intrusion into the parent-child
relationship may be harmful." 5 We know that "fit parent" means nothing more
than "adequate parent."3 But beyond this threshold, no agreement exists.
The results of a longitudinal study undertaken by psychologists at Berkeley
underscore society's inability to predict what the "best" experiences for a child
would be. Beginning in 1929, researchers studied a group of 166 infants born in
that year, tracking aspects of those individuals' lives for the next thirty years.
Various analyses were made of this fund of data. One such monograph focuses
on the socialization process of children up to age fourteen.367 After 200-plus
pages of painstaking analysis, the authors concluded that "[i]f [a child] is under
fairly stable and not too discontinuous pressures and secures enough approval and
support.., he becomes, to use the vernacular, 'socialized'[,] ... even without
361. The analysis in Lingo v. Kelsay, 651 So. 2d 499 (La. Ct. App. 1995), is different because
Louisiana's grandparent ,isitation statute requires a finding of "extraordinary circumstances" prior to an
award of visitation. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (1996). Since the term "extraordinary circumstances"
is interpreted quite differently from "best interests of the child" the Louisiana statute is not open-ended.
362. Brooks, 454 S.B.2d at 773.
363. Id. (citing J. Bohl, Brave New Statutes: Grandparent Visitation Statutes as Unconstitutional
Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State Power, 3 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 271,
294-98 (1993)).
364. See supra note 234.
365. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1975) (noting that there is little
agreement among experts and commentators as to when state intervention in a child's life is justified or
constructive). There is ccnsiderable judicial comment in othercontexts concerning the harm inflicted on
a child by the litigation process itself. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 442 (1989)
(judicial process involved in bypassing the parental notification requirement in a statute governing
minors' access to abortion); Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137
(Ind. 1990) (litigation involved in a loss of parental consortium claim); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197,
206 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) (litigation involved in a change of custody proceeding).
366. Santosky v. Kiamer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 n.15 (1982) ("Even when a child's natural home is
imperfect, permanent removal from that home will not necessarily improve his welfare.").
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this optimum combination, he frequently arrives at stable maturity [anyway]....
[W]e are not sure that we have begun to understand how or why."3
Reviewing the results at the thirty-year point of the study, Dr. Arlene Skolnick
made similar comments:
The experience of the Berkeley subjects showed the error of assuming
that childhood stress must inevitably lead to adult maladjustment ....
[T]he adult data showed that early difficulties could be overcome and
compensated for. The theoretical predictions of the researchers were also
jarred from the other direction by the adult status of the children who had
seemed especially blessed with ability, talent, popularity or easy and
confidence-inducing family lives."6
By taking the position that children's best interests are simply to remain in the
continuous undisturbed custody of their own fit parents, therefore, Hawk and Brooks
have simply applied well-settled constitutional principles of family integrity to
grandparent visitation law. When a child has fit, married parents who have not
faltered in their "high duty '370 as parents, "[t]he judge as amateur psychologist.
is neither an attractive nor a convincing figure.
371
Courts which affirm open-ended grandparent visitation statutes, on the other hand,
all purport to discern a "best interest of the child" apart from the child's uninter-
rupted contact with fit parents and uniformly fail to recognize harm or the threat of
harm to a child as a prerequisite to intrusive state action on a functional family.
Cases in this category all add two basic ingredients to hold that court-ordered
grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the child. The first ingredient is the
assertion that the development of a relationship between a grandparent and a
grandchild is presumptively beneficial. This finding is supported by assertions
which simply reference what the judges perceive to be common experience. The
King court announces, for example, that "a grand child will ordinarily benefit from
contact with the grandparents" and "[t]hat grandparents and grandchildren normally
have a special bond that cannot be denied."3' The Herndon court cites this
language from King, adding that "the development of a loving relationship" is
desirable.373 Similarly, in R.T. v. J.E.,374 the court cited King's assertion that
grandparent visitation statutes reasonably "advance" loving relationships among
families and noted that its own grandparent visitation statute was "premised upon
368. Id. at 221.
369. ARLENE SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT, EXPLORING MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
353-54 (1978).
370. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
371. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19 n.25 (1967) (citing David R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individual Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 808 (1966)).
372. King, 828 S.W.2d at 632.
373. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209-10.
374. 650 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
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the presumed beneficial relationship existing between grandparents and
grandchildren."" 5
The second ingredient courts in this category add to their analyses to reach the
conclusion that court-ordered visitation serves the best interest of the child is a
finding that the visitation will not harm the child. Thus, in a curious inversion of
the principle that the state may not intrude on a functional family absent a finding
of harm or the threat of harm to the child, these courts essentially conclude that
unless parents can eemonstrate that their child will be in danger, the fact that the
child will be safe with the grandparent, coupled with the presumed benefit to be
derived from the relationship, demonstrates that court-ordered grandparent visitation
serves the best interests of the child. For example, the Herndon court specifically
notes that "visitation would not endanger [the child's] physical health or impair [the
child's] emotional development.""37 Similarly, the King court notes that "[the
condition and safety of [the grandfather's] home was never in issue. '"" And in the
only reported case in which a court emphatically validated the constitutionality of
an open-ended grandparent visitation statute but found any award of visitation as
contrary to the best interests of the child, the court's refusal was grounded on a
finding of harm to the child. The court found that the grandmother's repeated
allegations that the child's father was sexually abusing the child had so embittered
the parents and so traumatized the child that an order of visitation would serve only
to add stress and anxiety to the child's already fragile emotional condition.37 The
best interests of the child determinations these courts make thus rest upon an
assertion that the child will be unharmed, coupled with a presumption that reduces
grandparents to a sentimental stereotype and contradicts common human experience
in the diversity and range of possible relationships to be found among people of all
ages.
The failure of ccurts validating open-ended grandparent visitation statutes to
recognize harm or the threat of harm to the child as an indispensable prerequisite
to coercive state intrusion on the functional family stems from a consistent
misapprehension of the legitimate sources and limitations of state power. To
illustrate the fact that a constitutional right to familial autonomy is not absolute, for
example, the Hernilon court cites Ginsberg v. New York and Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, asserting that they demonstrate the state's constitutional power to regulate
children and limit parental freedom." It fails to note, however, that a finding of
threatened harm to the child or children involved in each case was an indispensable
threshold in each decision. The Ginsberg Court carefully framed its opinion around
the state's duty to protect children from the harmful effects of pornography in
circumstances which supplemented rather than supplanted parental authority. ' No
375. Id. at 16.
376. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 206.
377. King, 828 S.W.2d at 633.
378. Sanchez v. Parker, No. CN93-09822, 1995 WL 489146, at *2 (Del. Fan. Ct. June 20, 1995).
379. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).




such threshold of threatened harm or respect for familial autonomy animates the
Herndon court's use of Ginsberg; however, to the Herndon court, Ginsberg simply
stands for the idea that "[tihe well being of its children is a subject within the state's
constitutional power to regulate,""3 ' apparently without precondition or limit.3"
Similarly, although the Prince Court found state contravention of a parenting
decision permissible only because of the "crippling" nature of the child labor at
issue,3" Herndon interpreted Prince simply as recognition of the state's "wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom.""lM
This general notion, that coercive state intrusion into the details of family life is
permissible absent any sign of familial inadequacy simply because a judge has
approved it, underlies every other decision validating grandparent visitation. The
King court asserts that familial privacy is not inviolate and lists circumstances where
regulation is appropriate without citation of specific authority or acknowledgment
that each circumstance described involved a threshold threat of harm."u Similarly,
the Beagle majority specifically rejects the argument that a finding of harm to the
child must precede the intrusion of court-ordered grandparent visitation. Quoting an
earlier Florida opinion, the Beagle majority agreed that it too could "find nothing
... that would preclude the state from passing a statute providing for reasonable
visitation by a grandparent with grandchildren upon the finding that such visitation
is in the child's best interest."3" With only minor variations, these unsupported
pronouncements have been repeated in all subsequent cases, affirming the validity
of open-ended grandparent visitation."3
Indeed, for these decisions, the idea that a limitation on state power is appropriate
and necessary at some point is virtually absent, with analysis focusing instead on
the "perceived benefit""38 of visitation. Presiding Justice Benham, dissenting from
the majority's invalidation of Georgia's open-ended grandparent visitation statute in
Brooks, first cites Prince and Ginsberg for the general proposition that a state may
constitutionally impose regulations simply to enhance the well being of its
children.3" He then notes the decades of judicial recognition that a child's best
interests will often include grandparent visitation."u He illustrates the primacy that
he believes a best-interests-of-the-child determination commands by describing a
1910 Georgia case in which a widowed father of unquestioned fitness is denied
381. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207.
382. The only apparent limitation Herndon places on this power to regulate involves inquiry into
the magnitude of the infringement on parental autonomy. Id. at 208. See supra notes 205-06 and
accompanying text.
383. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
384. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207.
385. King, 828 S.W.2d at 631.
386. Beagle v. Beagle, 654 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
387. See, e.g., Pollard v. Pollard, No. 532463, 1995 WL 534244, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1995); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13, 15-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
388. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 581 (Tenn. 1993).
389. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 777 (Ga.) (Benham, P.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 377 (1995).
390. Id. at 771.
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custody of his child "because it is 'the welfare of the little one' which is
paramount."39' Even this Orwellian conclusion, expressly condemned by the
United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois,3" fails to provoke discussion
of the limitations on the state's power to coercively intrude on family life. The
Hawk court's assertion that "[tihe requirement of harm is the sole protection that
parents have against pervasive state interference in the parenting process" '393 needs
no further explication.
Conclusion
Open-ended grandparent visitation statutes override the decisions of fit parents
regarding who their minor children will associate with, thus allowing the state to
intrude directly upon a central aspect of family life. Since this intrusion implicates
the family's constitutional right to integrity, grandparent visitation statutes
necessarily trigger strict judicial scrutiny; since they further no compelling state
interest, they inevitably fail.
On the most basic level, furthermore, grandparent visitation statutes are invalid
because they are not a legitimate exercise of state power. A state simply has no
general authority to "make things better." The most optimistic advocate of visitation
statutes could hardly find them an appropriate exercise of police power; the
uneventful life of a child living with fit parents does not trigger the parens patriae
authority of the state. Indeed, although we recognize that a child needs fit parents,
we cannot even agree on where else that child's best interests might lie.
Perhaps the real significance of forced grandparent visitation, therefore, lies not
in individual grandparent visitation statutes or in the individual grandparent
visitation suits but in the implications of this type of statute for society as a whole.
We may treasure our own grandparents or delight in our children's children;
however, the profound pleasures of such voluntary associations are simply not
relevant here. If we collectively allow grandparent visitation to be forced upon an
unwilling family for no better reason than that some robed stranger thought it best,
we have embarked upon a slow decent into judicial supervision of family life which
has neither legal limits nor a logical end.
391. Id. at 773 (citing Evans v. Lane, 70 S.E. 603 (Ga. 1910)).
392. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
393. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580.
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